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Draft chapter 7 for Handbook of Economics and Technical Change, Bronwyn Hall 
and Nathan Rosenberg, Editors.  This chapter was partially sponsored by “The 
Knowledge-Based Society”, Research Council of Norway project 172603/V10.  I.  Introduction 
 
This chapter presents a selective survey of the literature on the theory of intellectual 
property and innovation incentives.  We will outline the broad effects that have been 
identified with an eye to presenting a good range of modelling styles and issues.  With 
regret, length considerations mean that we only cover patents.     
 
We start by sketching the patent right and the associated institutional background that 
we will refer back to later when discussing the models.  Next, we pass to some broad 
modelling issues, including the goals of the patent system and how they have been 
translated into objectives for policymakers.  We outline basic theories of intellectual 
property design and the welfare tradeoffs they suggest.  As a benchmark, we briefly 
consider how far we can get towards our social goals without intellectual property 
protection or, alternatively, how the incentive to innovate can be conceptualised when 
actors opt for secrecy as a means of protecting intellectual property.  Next, we will 
look at the issues in patent design that have been investigated over the last forty years 
or so.  We start with the simplest case of a single, one-time innovation and then look 
at how our conclusions on design change when we consider innovations that either 
build on each other or fit together as complements.  We start from models that 
consider a system of intellectual property protection that is quite similar to existing 
institutions, then move on to mechanisms that start from something closer to a “blank 
slate” to optimally procure innovation.  We consider issues of enforcement and the 
interplay between competition policy and intellectual property policy briefly at the 
end of the survey.   
 
 
II.  A Brief Sketch of the Patent Right 
 
 
In order to set the stage, we elaborate here some of the salient features of the patent 
right that underlie the models that follow
1.    The US and Europe will be our focus.  
Indeed, the differences between the US and Europe illustrate the range of policy tools 
that can be brought to bear on patent design.  Further, the differences add up to a 
somewhat different patent right on the two sides of the Atlantic, with a tighter, more 
expensive, and more industrially-oriented version in Europe.   
 
What is a patent? 
 
A patent
2 refers to a temporary property right on an invention.  The patent provides a 
right – but not a guarantee -- to exclude others from making, using or selling the 
patented property.  Indeed, the patent holder generally has no obligation or necessarily 
even the right to practice the innovation.  For example, if inventor A is granted a 
patent, where the exercise of that patent would infringe the patent rights of inventor B, 
inventor A has no automatic authorisation to exercise her patent.  Her right is 
                                                 
1A more complete description of the patent right, including its history, can be found in  Scotchmer 
(2004), Guellec and van Pottelsberghe de la Potterie (2007), and Jaffe and Lerner (2006).    
2See Guellec and van Pottelsberghe (2007) and Jaffe and Lerner (2006)  for more detailed discussion of  
the philosophical differences between European and US views of patents.  For an argument for a 
constitutional underpinning of patent rights, see Nard and Morriss (2006).     dependent on the patent rights of B
3. Furthermore, the exercise of patent rights must 
fall within other laws, such as antitrust laws. In the same way as an individual may 
own a gun but not be allowed to shoot people with it, an inventor may be granted a 
patent but not be allowed to use it entirely as she pleases: she must do so within the 
scope of the general body of law.   
 
In exchange for these exclusionary rights, the patent holder must publicly disclose the 
invention as part of a publicly available patent document.  In the US, this public 
disclosure must be such that a person with sufficient background knowledge (“skilled 
in the art”) could make or use the innovation in its “best mode” at the time of filing.  
Of course, for patents filed relatively early in the development cycle the “best mode” 
may be quite rudimentary, lacking many of the improvements that make the invention 
economical to exploit.  While there are some differences in how it is interpreted 
between Europe and the US
4, the disclosure should be viewed as broadly helpful to 
third parties wishing to understand the nature of the innovation.  While the 
embodiment of the innovation is protected by the patent, the underlying idea is not.  
Furthermore, the idea should be – and generally is -- relatively transparent in the 
disclosure.    
 
The features of the innovation must be described in a set of claims, which define the 
metes and bounds of the patent.  Features not claimed are not covered by patent 
protection.  While claims generally are interpreted as real and proven features of the 
innovation, the distinction between real and suspected features can be difficult to 
establish
5.  The ex post interpretation of claims in rapidly developing fields, where 
changes in the dominant approach affects the interpretation of claims, may be 
challenging despite efforts made to write them clearly at the time of filing.    
  
Patentable subject matter is varied.  Examples could include a process or product, a 
composition of matter (such as a chemical composition) or machine, or a new and 
useful improvement on any of these.  Indeed, as a result of a series of court decisions
6 
patentable subject matter in the US has broadened over the past thirty years to include 
the products of genetic manipulation, software and business methods.  Indeed, 
“anything under the sun made by man” could potentially be patentable according to 
one decision
7.  Patentable subject matter in the US remains relatively broad compared 
to other countries, despite extensions that have occurred elsewhere.    This partly 
stems from some differences in the general philosophy of patentable subject matter, 
tending more towards technicality and industrial applicability in Europe than in the 
US.  These differences have been cited as resulting in the slower movement in Europe 




                                                 
3 In other words, an innovation can be patentable but still infringe another patent. 
4 See Guellec and van Pottelsberghe (2007), especially pp. 39-41. 
5 See Guellec and van Pottelsberghe (2007), p. 139 and Bidgoli (2009). 
6 See, for example, Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (1980), Diamond v. Diehr,  450 U.S. 175 
(1981) and State Street Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Financial Group, Inc. 149 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 
1998). 
7 Contained in Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (1980). 
8 For a discussion of business method patents in practice in Europe, see  Harhoff, D., Wagner, S. 
(2006).  For a more general discussion of trends in patentable subject matter in Europe, see Guellec and 
van Pottelsberghe (2007), especially pp. 119-132. In most patent systems, a patentable innovation must represent a significant 
innovative step.  Indeed, one of the distinctive features of a patent compared to other 
intellectual property protection such as copyright is that patent systems have often 
been thought of as applying to relatively large advances.  In other words, the strong 
exclusionary patent right is granted only in exchange for the disclosure of “valuable” 
information.  In point of fact, the requirement of significance differs across countries 
and has differed over time.  In the US, a patentable innovation is required to be non-
obvious as well as new. Judging whether an innovation indeed satisfies the conditions 
of patentability is a main role of the US Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO). In 
contrast, some patent systems have traditionally been mere “registration systems”, 
where little or no screening is done to weed out little from big steps.  Jaffe and Lerner 
(2006) document a recent trend in the US towards weaker requirements of 
“significance” due to workload, incentive system, and other pressures at the USPTO.  
Hence the concept of significance cannot be considered static but instead responds to 
intentional or unintentional changes in patent approval practice. The European Patent 
Office (EPO) has attempted to unify for European states the inventive step that is 
required in order to qualify for a patent.  This requirement has varied across states 
from a “scintilla of invention” to a relatively high standard of novelty and non-
obviousness.  In both the US and Europe, the evaluation of significance is generally 
thought of as an evaluation of how big a step the innovation makes in a scientific or 
technical sense.  Commercial success can be used ex post only in a limited way as an 
argument that an innovation was significant, with the US viewing this sort of evidence 
somewhat more favourably than Europe
9.    
    
Once granted, a patent may be exercised, traded (sold or “rented” via a licensing 
contract, or otherwise transferred) or abandoned, like other forms of property. Indeed, 
contracts of trade are very common, amounting to somewhere between 10 and 20% of 
the patents issued
10.  While it is common for licenses to be agreed ex post -- after a 
patent has issued -- this is not the only timing that is observed.  Licenses can, in 
principle, be agreed before discovery or even before investment in a research path has 
begun.  These sorts of prospective or ex ante agreements specify sharing 
arrangements for any patents that might issue as a result of a research programme.  A 
wide variety of pricing arrangements from no price at all to up-front fixed fees, per 
unit or revenue-based royalties, profit shares, reciprocal trades of other patents, or 
other in kind payments can be observed in licensing agreements
11.  Even if quite 
standard pricing schemes, such as simple royalties, are specified, contracts can vary as 
to how these payments are spread over time.   
 
Patents differ from many other forms of property in the sense that they are temporary 
and not permanent rights.  Patent protection lasts a statutory maximum of 20 years 
from the date of filing. In the US, this represents a change from the 17 years that were 
available from the date of grant prior to the 1994 agreement on Trade Related Aspects 
of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS).  Indeed, the patent term has varied over time 
in a wide number of countries
12.  Statutory protection need not last this long, 
however, as periodic renewal payments often are required to maintain the right up to 
its statutory maximum term.  Patents frequently are allowed to lapse.  Only about 8% 
                                                 
9 See Guellec and van Pottelsberghe (2007), p. 137. 
10 See Guellec and van Pottelsberghe (2007), p. 92. 
11 See Anand and Khanna (2000) for observed license contract structure. 
12 See Jaffe and Lerner (2006), especially pp. 82-94. of all patents go to full term in Europe, although considerably more reach term in the 
US
13. This discrepancy is likely due in part to the differences in the maintenance 
expenses involved.  When translation, maintenance, processing and external 
(including legal) costs are included, a European patent valid in all member states 
could cost ten times more than a US patent for a 20 year term
14.  Extension of the 
patent term beyond 20 years is clearly much more difficult, and can only be attempted 
by indirect strategies
15.  A “continuation”, whereby modifications of an original 
patent application can be filed over time, can be used to attempt something like a term 
extension in the US.  Continuations constitute a significant amount (about a third) of 
US examiner workload at the moment, so they are not rare occurrences
16.  Indeed, 
abuse of this system has been discussed recently by Jaffe and Lerner (2006)
17.  In 
Europe, the closest proxy of term extensions is probably to exploit so called 
“dependent” patents. Generally, however, the scope for this sort of behaviour in 
Europe appears more limited than in the US
18.  
 
Patent Agreements and Administration 
 
The basic system of patents that is used in the United States is set forth in Article 1, 
Section 8 of the United States Constitution where Congress is granted the power “To 
Promote the Progress of Science and Useful Arts by securing for limited Times to 
Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and 
Discoveries”.  Under this power, Congress has enacted various patent laws, the first in 
1790, with various revisions added over time.  These are codified in title 35 of the 
United States Code.  Congress has also created the United States Patent and 
Trademark Office to administer these laws and perform other duties related to patent 
protection.  More recently, patent laws in a variety of countries, including the US, 
have been aligned under the TRIPs (Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property) 
agreements.  Other key treaties have included the Paris Convention (which specifies 
that a first patent filing date in any member state can serve as the patent application 
date for any subsequent member state filing), the European Patent Convention (which 
establishes the European Patent Office as a means of coordinating patent grants within 
Europe) and the Patent Cooperation Treaty (which establishes a uniform procedure 
for filing patent applications in the member states).    
 
In Europe, patents may issue from either the patent office of individual countries or 
from the European Patent Office, or both.  In fact, a common practice is to file at the 
EPO only after having filed at the patent office of a specific European country or the 
                                                 
13 See Guellec and van Pottelsberghe (2007) p. 148 for European figures.  For the US, the percentage 
reaching term appears to be about a third, see Lemley (2001).   
14 See Guellec and van Pottelsberghe (2007), ch 7, for an extensive comparison of operations at the 
USPTO, EPO and Japanese Patent Office (JPO).  Under the London Agreement, which came into force 
in May, 2008, translation fees are anticipated to fall considerably. 
15 A brief scan of the web leads to hits on a variety of ideas to “game the system” to obtain effective 
extensions.   http://www.mewburn.com/Patent/US_Patents:_Term_extensions.htm, accessed 29/7/08 
for one such example. 
16 See http://www.uspto.gov for details.  For a more complete discussion of strategic uses of 
continuations, see Lemley and Shapiro (2005). 
17 More generally, strategic (ab)use of filing procedures has been documented in van Zeebroek and van 
Pottelsberghe (2008) and references therein. 
18 See Guellec and van Pottelsberghe (2007), p. 145. US
19.  The administrative body responsible for implementing patent grants, such as 
the USPTO or the EPO, reviews patent applications to determine if the candidate 
invention satisfies the minimum standards for patentability: novelty and 
nonobviousness being the most salient characteristics.  If the candidate technology is 
determined not to satisfy this minimum standard, the patent can be denied.  A patent 
can issue after the review process has concluded
20.  This often takes years, with about 
one out of three patent applications being finally rejected in the US
21.  While the 
period of exclusivity starts at the date of issuance, or grant, of the patent, the patent 
disclosure -- the information on the nature of the innovation -- is now published 18 
months after the initial filing with the patent office in most cases.  This represents a 
change in the US compared to the older system of being published only at the time of 
patent grant, which was in force prior to the implementation of the American 




Patents are only as strong as their enforcement.  Enforcement is handled privately in 
the US (for the most part in civil suits) through the court system.  For example, if a 
patent-holder detects infringement within the jurisdiction of the patent, the patent-
holder can sue the violator in court.  Infringement suits tend to be extremely 
expensive
22 and, indeed, can constitute a substantial proportion of total research 
expenditure
23.  Further, the cost can include a substantial joint loss of wealth rather 
than a simple transfer from infringer to patent-holder (Bessen and Meurer (2008b)).  
If the court finds for the patent-holder it may impose an injunction on the violator 
prohibiting sales of the infringing item and may impose monetary compensation of 
another type, such as damages.  Indeed, a temporary injunction may be imposed even 
before this.  Of course, the defendant can counter-sue as well.  A common response to 
an infringement suit is a counter-claim that the infringed patent was not valid in the 
first place.  Overall, few patents – on average 1.5% of all patents granted -- are ever 
litigated, and fewer still -- on the order of 0.1% -- ever go to trial
24.  Those that are 
litigated appear to be the high value patents and those drawn from a subset of 
                                                 
19 This may be done in order to obtain several chances at obtaining a valid national patent. As the EPO 
tends to produce feedback on the patentability of the innovation slowly compared to national offices or 
the US, this strategy also has the advantage of providing valuable early feedback to the applicant as to 
whether the application is worthwhile to pursue.  Furthermore, as the USPTO allows more substantial 
changes to be introduced to the patent document after filing, it may make sense to file at the USPTO 
early and then file a better-crafted document at the EPO later.  See Guellec and van Pottelsberghe 
(2007), p. 155-159, for patent filing routes. 
 
20 Other possible outcomes, which differ between the US and Europe, include withdrawal or revision of 
the document.  See Guellec and Van Pottelsberghe (2007) or Jaffe and Lerner (2006) for details.   
21 See http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/com/speeches/07-46.htm for example.  From this press 
release, it is clear that there is considerable variance across years included in this figure.  See also 
Harhoff and Wagner (2005).  Ebert (2004), commenting on the role of patent continuations in the US 
system, obtains a somewhat lower adjusted rejection rate of ¼.   
22 See Bessen and Meurer (2008a) for estimates.   
23 Lerner (1995) estimates that cases begun in 1991 in the US would eventually total legal 
expenditures, in 1991 dollars, of about 27% of all of the basic research expenditure in the US in 1991. 
24 See Lanjouw and Schankerman (2001), and Lemley (2001).  In other words, about 95% of litigated 
patents settle out of court.   particularly litigious technology areas
25.  The success rate for patent holders in trials 
has risen over time
26, a change often attributed to the creation of the unified Court of 
Appeals of the Federal Circuit in 1982.   
 
The European approach relies much more on an oppositions system to weed out “bad” 
patent grants relatively promptly.  Third parties may submit opinions during the 
patent examination – to a limited extent -- on whether a patent grant should be made 
and to a greater extent during a centralised post-grant oppositions procedure
27.  This 
is a less expensive route to challenge patents in terms of both time and money than 
full litigation in a court of law and is accessed somewhat more frequently than 
litigation in the US: somewhat over 6% of all issued patents are challenged in this 
way
28.  Even though few granted patents go through oppositions, the system and the 
potential to go through oppositions is cited as a pillar of quality control at the EPO, 
allowing bad patents – those that do not “in truth” satisfy patenting criteria -- to be 
screened out shortly after issue
29.       
 
Aside from the oppositions procedure, a second difference in enforcement between 
Europe and the US is that an EPO patent is, in fact, a bundle of national patents (in the 
countries designated by the applicant).  National laws apply to these patents, with any 
legal challenges being pursued at the national level.  In other words, there is no 
unified court to deal with patent disputes for the whole of Europe.  This can make for 
multiple litigations in many European jurisdictions with potentially contradictory 
outcomes
30.         
 
A final area of difference across the Atlantic is what constitutes infringement.  A 
“doctrine of equivalents” may be used to judge whether infringement has occurred 
even if the infringing item is not a perfect replica of the patented invention.  In other 
words, the looser the interpretation of what constitutes the invention, the greater the 
“breadth” of the patent protection.  Further, an “experimental exemption” allows use 
of the patented technology for research purposes.  Europe has had a more restrictive 
interpretation than the US on the doctrine of equivalents, but has tended to take a 
broader view of the research exemption when it comes to university research.  This 
helps explain why infringement decisions for similar types of patents sometimes 
differ in Europe and the US
31. 
                                                 
25 See Lanjouw and Schankerman (2001, 2004) and Lerner (1995) for statistics and discussion.  While 
some industries have litigation rates as high as 6%, Lanjouw and Schankerman find, in fact, a much 
lower average rate of litigation at less than 2%.  See also Scotchmer (2004), chapter 7 for an overview.   
26 See Jaffe (2000). Allison and Lemley (1998) find that, of the patents litigated to a final determination 
in their dataset, 46% are held invalid.   
27 Hall et al. (2003) and Harhoff and Reitzig (2004) document the use of this system.  See also Guellec 
and van Pottelsberghe (2007), p. 176.   
28 See Harhoff and Reitzig (2004) for figures and detailed discussion of EPO oppositions.  The 
frequency of opposition seems to have fallen modestly over time. 
29 See Guellec and van Pottelsberghe (2007) p. 178. 
30 The draft European Patent Litigation Agreement aims to centralise litigation, but has not yet been 
adopted.  For more information see http://www.epo.org/patents/law/legislative-initiatives/epla.html. 
31 An important recent decision involving a change in the interpretation of the doctrine of equivalents in 
the US is Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722 (2002) .  See also 
Weston (1998) for a comparative treatment of the doctrine of equivalents in Europe and the US.  EU 
Directives 2001/82/EC Articles 13(1) to 13(7) and 2001/83/EC Articles 10(1) to 10(5) attempt to 
harmonize European approaches to the experimental exemption.  For discussion of cross-Atlantic 
differences in the treatment of university research, see also Guellec and van Pottelsberghe (2007) p.  
Summary 
 
This brief sketch of the patent right suggests a number of policy levers that can be 
exercised in order to affect the innovation incentives that actually derive from the 
patent system.  Clearly, one set of policy levers applies to the design of the patent 
right itself: notably the statutory length of protection, how broadly we interpret the 
exclusive right, what is disclosed and when this occurs, the size of the inventive step 
required to earn protection, and what constitutes patentable subject matter.   
Intervention exercising these levers has occurred in both the US and Europe over 
time, resulting in a process of evolution of the patent right
32.  A second set of levers 
applies to the administration of the patent, including how procedures implement the 
general aims of patent protection.  These include the structure of the review process, 
the structure of fees, the incentives of patent examiners and other administrative 
features
33.  Again, all these features have evolved over time.  A third set of levers 
applies to the enforcement of the patent in court and includes success rates for patent 
holders in infringement suits, the types and sizes of remedies imposed and the fora in 
which patent defence and attack can occur
34.  A final set of levers applies to the 
freedom with which patent holders can exercise their rights under other bodies of law.  
A main case in point is the effect of competition policy on the amount of profit that 
can be extracted from the patent right
35.  This could vary from simple limits on 
excessive pricing to limits on the ability or necessity to license as well as the licensing 
contract structure.  The literature has examined interventions at all these levels and, in 
some cases, interactions between different levers.  A case in point is the interaction 
between enforcement methods and patent quality, which will be discussed later.   
Translating the available administrative and legal policy levers into features of 
economic models that accurately reflect these levers is, of course, a major challenge.   
We now turn to how this challenge has been addressed.            
 
     III. Economic Interpretation of the Patent Process  
 
We will now use the US system to outline issues in the interpretation of the patent 
process that determine the basic building blocks on which the rest of the modelling 
rests.  The issues we deal with are the objective function of policy-makers, the source 
of value of the patent, and the basic functions of the patent that determine its private 
and social welfare effects.  By and large, these basic features are shared with non-US 
patent systems, so the focus on the US is for expositional convenience.   
   
Interpreting the Goal(s) of Patent Policy 
    
                                                                                                                                            
190-191.  A recent and significant case on the experimental exemption is Madey v. Duke University, 
307 F.3d 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2002), summarised in Janis (2003). 
32 For example, the recent patent term extensions in the US in accord with the TRIPS agreements and 
the somewhat slower evolution of patentable subject matter in Europe versus the US.      
33 See Jaffe and Lerner (2006) and Guellec and van Pottelsberghe (2007) for a detailed discussion of 
change in administrative procedures in Europe and the US. 
34 Allison and Lemley (1998) and Jaffe and Lerner (2006) discuss how the move to a unified court of 
appeals in the US has changed success rates of litigation and litigation strategy.   
35 A simple example t keep in mind for later parts of the chapter could be strict enforcement of EU 
Article 82(a), which forbids “excessive pricing” by a dominant firm.    Article 1, Section 8 of the US Constitution is quite explicit that the objective of the 
intellectual property rights system is the progress of “Science and the Useful Arts”
 36.. 
If one were to take this at its word, one would not necessarily want to use social 
welfare – or even economic growth -- as the standard of optimality in a model of the 
intellectual property rights system.  Instead, one might wish to use the rate of 
innovation or, less directly, the rate of research and development spending: the more 
the better.  The interpretation one takes is important to the conclusions one reaches 
about the optimality of any intellectual property protection system.  For example, 
Horowitz and Lai (1996) compare the optimal design of patents when the objective is 
to maximise the rate of innovation to the optimal design when the objective is to 
maximise discounted consumers’ surplus.  A system that aims to maximise 
consumers’ surplus places more value on frequent innovation than a system that 
maximises the rate of innovation since intermediate steps generate surplus gains for 
each quality step that enters consumption. Despite the ambiguity in how one should 
interpret the goal of establishing a system of intellectual property rights in the first 
place, however, the bulk of the economics literature has taken social welfare to be the 
appropriate objective that is maximised by policy-makers.   
 
A second issue of interpretation of Article 1, Section 8 is how we understand 
“progress” in “Science and the Useful Arts”.  Most models capture the significance of 
patented innovation by some value which is created for society. In some models this 
value is interpreted as a private market value
37.  The actual patent approval process 
does not make such a direct link between commercial and scientific or technical 
value, however.  Indeed, the patent document and the review process identify a 
technical value as well as the source of that value quite explicitly, and also judges 
“usefulness”, but does not go farther to determine any kind of monetary value. 
Therefore, the patent office makes no direct judgment at the time of grant on market 
or any other private value to the inventor, has no particular expertise in this area, and 
does not make market value an explicit criterion for patentability
38.  Protection is not 
tailored ex ante to such a notion of market value.   
 
While the link between value that could be captured by a profit maximising firm and 
value in terms of technical progress could, in principle, be quite tenuous, as a practical 
matter they are more closely linked. Since patents are expensive to obtain inventors 
who are concerned with their own profits would not apply for patents if they 
anticipated no resulting private commercial value.  This leads to the interpretation, 
taken by Scotchmer (1999) and Cornelli and Schankerman (1999), that inventors have 
– and seek -- information about whether or not a patent will generate private market 
value even if the patent office has – and seeks -- little information on this count.  The 
inventors’ information is revealed by their patenting behaviour.  In particular, 
inventions with higher private value may precisely be those that are observed to be 
patented and where that patent is observed to be renewed despite renewal fees.  
                                                 
36 Not all patent systems have a constitutional basis, so in this sense a focus on the US system is 
somewhat special.  While we will not pursue the consequences of this institutional feature of the US 
patent system, Nard and Morriss (2006) argue that constitutional patent law strengthens the bargain 
between the state and inventor compared to systems such as patronage.  See Jaffe and Lerner (2006) 
and Scotchmer (2004) for histories of the patent systems and their legal bases. 
37 For example, Gilbert and Shapiro (1990) interpret this value as a flow rate of profits.   
38 As was pointed out earlier, however, the commercial value of an innovation can be brought in a 
limited way in some jurisdictions as evidence ex post that an innovation was a “non-obvious” or 
“useful” step. Hence, (continued) patent protection is correlated with innovations that have higher 
private value in the eyes of their inventors
39. 
 
Finally, regardless of the magnitude of the invention’s contribution, there is a question 
of when the value is realised for society or for the inventor compared to when the 
patent right is awarded.  La Manna (1994) points out that if the patent right is awarded 
early, before much of the expenditure to develop the innovation has been incurred, 
then the exclusionary right ensures that the patent holder can reap the entire reward to 
its expenditure before that expenditure is incurred.  If the right is granted late, and 
many firms may compete for that right, then the potential patent holder only faces an 
expected benefit at the time of its research investment.  The difference between these 
two scenarios can affect the incentives to invest, as the patent holder is in a “race” for 
the right to the fruits of its investment in the latter case but is not in the former case.     
 
More generally, the issue of “when” a stream of social benefits is created also turns on 
“how” the benefits are created.  The social and private value of a patent need not flow 
directly from the technology that is patented, but may be largely derivative. Value 
may flow primarily from the innovations a patented advance inspires (“follow-on 
innovations”) or from companion innovations that are used together to create a 
valuable product (“complementary innovations”).  In both these cases, a single patent 
in isolation may have no private value at all.  Indeed, a case we will examine later is 
that of “pure research tools”: innovations that have technical value but no monetary 
value in isolation.  In such cases, a main function of the patent right is to facilitate the 
transfer of value via licensing contracts from the follow-on innovations or the 
complementary innovations back to the holder of a “key” patent.  Indeed, Hall (2007) 
presents evidence that patents do actually facilitate such trade in intellectual property.                       
 
The Reward and Contract Theories of Patents 
 
Article 1 Section 8 goes on to specify a method that should be used to achieve its 
stated goal of the “Progress of Science and the Useful Arts”.  Specifically, a system of 
exclusive rights to make, sell and use the innovation is granted for a limited time.  
There are two main ways one can imagine that the patent right could promote the 
progress of science.   
 
The first mechanism is the establishment of a private reward for innovation.  This is 
sometimes called the “reward theory” of patent protection and is presented in the 
classic work of Nordhaus (1969).  The argument is that by generating potential 
monopoly power – and thus patent monopoly rents – exclusivity provides 
remuneration for successful innovators.  If the cost to generating an innovation is 
privately borne, then the anticipation of such private compensation is a necessary 
“reward” to induce innovation in a market setting with profit-maximising agents.  If 
exclusive rights were not available to the innovator, and if the underlying knowledge  
is a pure public good, any party could use this information to duplicate the invention 
and compete with the patent-holder to provide it to purchasers.  This kind of 
competition could reduce the rewards to innovation to the point where it would not be 
worthwhile to conduct the activity in the first place.  Hence, the patent system 
                                                 
39 Many papers have examined patent value and its correlates, see Bessen (2006) and references 
therein.   promotes innovation that would otherwise be underprovided by the market due to a 
positive informational externality.       
 
Consider first the “classic case” where a single inventor has exclusive rights to supply 
an invention that is deemed useful. This inventor is, then, a monopolist over some 
(residual) demand curve.  If the inventor sets a single price, as a monopolist, it can 
earn profits labelled π in figure 1.  This is the private “reward” for the inventive effort.  
Of course, these monopoly profits come hand in hand with consumer’s surplus, s, but 
also a deadweight loss, d, created by the monopoly pricing.  Hence, there is a social 
cost to ensuring the reward to innovation.  The private value captured by the inventor 
is less than the social value created by the innovation:  only by awarding the entire 
social surplus, the triangle W = (π+s+d), could firms’ incentives be brought in line 
with society’s.  Hence, the incentive to generate scientific progress, while positive, is 
socially too low in such a system, creating a dynamic welfare loss.     
 
Figure 1 about here 
 
Despite this argument, one cannot conclude, in fact, that a system of temporary 
exclusion rights necessarily creates socially insufficient incentives to innovate.   
Exclusivity also generates forces that can create socially excessive incentives to 
innovate.  The patent right designates no single party that is allowed to attempt the 
innovation: anyone can potentially compete for the intellectual property right and the 
benefits derived from it.  In fact, if there are several potential innovators who can 
compete for the right to earn the “reward” to innovation, there may be socially too 
strong incentives to invest in innovation.  Each potential innovator has the incentive to 
win the prize to “steal business” from its rival.  In other words, the competitors for 
this prize do not take into account a negative externality that each exerts on others 
when making an effort to win, leaving losers with nothing to show for their – 
privately and socially costly -- efforts.  Hence, even in the context of a single 
innovation if there is more than one potential innovator, the market may generate 
socially excessive incentives to innovate.     
 
More formally, and following Scotchmer (2004), consider a case where two firms are 
potential researchers.  Successful innovation by either firm generates social value W, 
but there is no additional social value generated by duplicative innovation.   Let the 
prize a firm wins for being the sole innovator be π.  Suppose that innovation is 
probabilistic, so investment generates a probability, p, of successful innovation for the 
investor and a probability 1-p of failure.  Of course, it could be possible that both 
would simultaneously be successful.  In this case, the prize is split evenly between the 
two firms.  In this framework, the contribution of each additional researcher to social 
surplus, when the success probabilities are independent and uncorrelated, is 
 
                     p(1-p)W 
 
Having a second researcher is only valuable if the first researcher fails but the second 
is successful.  If this exceeds the incremental cost of research of an additional 
researcher, then society would benefit from the effort of a second researcher.  The 
private contribution, which determines whether a single researcher actually enters or 
not, is the reward to being the sole winner in the event of failure by the other 
researcher plus the reward in the event of joint success:   
    p(1-p)π + p
2(1/2)π = (p-p
2)π + p
2 (π /2). 
 
If this exceeds the incremental cost of research, then a private firm would benefit 
from entry.   
 
There are two differences between these two expressions.  First, the value is W in the 
former and only π in the latter.  In this sense, there is an under-incentive to conduct 
research.  Now, refer back to figure 1 and set W=π, so that π reflects the entire social 
surplus of the innovation. The first term in the private incentive is now the same as 
the social benefit; however, we also have a second term in the private incentive 
reflecting the gain to any one inventor when both firms invest and are “lucky”.  This 
raises the private incentive for the inventor.  An analogous term does not enter into 
the social benefit because society does not obtain any more surplus when both firms 
succeed than when one succeeds: society only cares that someone – anyone -- makes 
the discovery.  In contrast, individual inventors care very much who succeeds: the 
winner obtains a prize whereas the loser obtains nothing. Hence, the private incentive 
exceeds the social incentive due to this second term.  In fact, if the research strategies 
are perfectly positively correlated (so that success by one firm always accompanies 
success by the other firm), there is no benefit at all to society of adding a second 
researcher. On the other hand, there is a positive private benefit for each individual 
firm since each stands an even chance of receiving the prize.  Hence, the patent 
reward for innovation can create incentives to invent, but these incentives can – in 
general – either exceed or fall short of the social optimum.     
 
A conclusion from this line of reasoning is that the basic assumptions we make about 
entry conditions into new research trajectories are likely to affect the conclusions we 
reach about whether incentives to invent are likely to need to be increased or 
decreased.  If the trajectories are publicly known and the resources to pursue them are 
freely available, we may be rightly concerned about excessive incentives to innovate.  
If ideas are revealed to innovators in a unique way, then the concern about socially 
excessive entry into a “common pool” may be irrelevant.  We may need to increase 
the incentives to invent in this “private information” case.   
 
There is a second mechanism by which the exclusionary rights of the patent can create 
benefits from invention and “promote the progress of science”.  When innovations are 
created, so is information.  This can be specific information on the nature of the 
innovation or it can be in the form of showing that a particular approach to a problem 
is possible and fruitful. Creating this information is privately costly, but socially 
useful since it can facilitate innovation by others.  The usefulness may be in entirely 
different fields or markets, so the reward to private innovation need not fall below the 
investment cost.  Still, there is a positive externality exerted by the creators of 
information.  This drives a wedge between the private and social incentives to exert 
inventive effort, suggesting that information provision needs to be encouraged as it 
will tend to be under-provided in the market
40.  In particular, even if adequate rewards 
are available to induce the creation of information, it may be held secret.   
 
                                                 
40 Before, W>π due to monopoly pricing that caused a deadweight loss.  Here, W>π even if pricing is 
not an issue.    
The diffusion of information is an explicit goal of the patent system.  The “contract 
theory” of patenting views patents as “contracts” between inventors and society where 
the patent right is granted in exchange for diffusion of the information that is useful to 
imitators, followers, or others who exploit the information to generate further social 
gains
41. The patent documents create a – freely accessible – library of such 
information.  Even if the rewards to patents and secrecy were the same for the original 
innovators (so that the same incentive to create information exists) disclosure 
considerations could make the patent system superior due to the benefits to others.  Of 
course, this argument relies on an assumption that systems that allow secrecy actually 
generate secrecy and that the patent library generates accessible and interpretable 
information.  We will consider these issues below. 
 
Summarising, the “reward” and the “contract” theories of patents form the 
underpinning of how patents generate scientific progress.  Reward and information 
benefits can be seen as underlying both single innovation models of patent design and 
models of multiple innovations, which we review below but their weighting 
determines the focus and design of the model.  Before discussing these, however, we 
look at a benchmark where we assume that no intellectual property protection is 
available.  In this framework, we will see under what conditions we can, indeed, 
generate innovation incentives despite the lack of protection.     
      
 
IV. Incentives to Innovate in the Absence of Intellectual Property Protection 
    
Is a system granting exclusive rights to innovators necessary to generate a reward or 
disclosure?  Let no intellectual property right exist.  Further, as soon as an innovative 
product is sold or used let a variety of individuals become familiar with the invention, 
creating the seeds for imitation.  If the innovation generates profits, potential imitators 
are attracted to the innovation to produce their own versions of it.  This process 
creates a variety of suppliers of the innovative product or process, driving down its 
price and so the profits of the original innovator.  If this process is quick or very 
cheap, then very little surplus is captured by the initial innovator.  Indeed, if the cost 
of developing the innovation in the first place was privately borne, the rapid imitation 
can reduce the benefits from innovating below the original cost. Any innovator 
anticipating this process will not invest in the innovation in the first place.  In essence, 
the innovator contributes to a common pool of knowledge when she creates and 
practices an innovation.  This positive externality, if it is not captured by the inventor, 
generates a private under-incentive to innovate.  The patent resolves this problem by 
making the embodiment of the innovation – in other words, the “object” that is 
actually traded in the marketplace – a private good even though the underlying 
knowledge remains a public good. 
 
Many objections have been raised to this argument.  These focus on its underlying 
assumptions that monetary gain is the motivator for invention, and that the imitation 
process is quick, costless, and purely duplicative.  A related point is that the patent 
                                                 
41 See Denicolo and Franzoni (2004) for discussion.  Also see Eisenberg (1989) and Miller and Davis 
(1983) for more complete presentations of legal theories of patent rights linked to diffusion and  the 
“natural rights” doctrine.  In an early paper, Arrow(1962) pointed to patents as a way of encouraging 
information disclosure. system may be the wrong solution to the problem, to the extent that a problem exists 
at all.  We will address only the former points here, leaving optimal design issues to 
later in the chapter. 
 
A common concern is that many inventors do not care about monetary gain and are 
altruistic givers to society who place utility value on the creation of this externality or 
simply place utility value on the process of creation
42.  Of course, since the patent 
system is voluntary, the fact that rewards are not necessary to induce the creation and 
sharing of innovation is not really an objection to the system: inventors are always 
free to donate their innovations to society.  Furthermore, while the pleasure of 
creation is enough to generate prototypes, it may not be enough to generate the much 
larger development and commercialisation expenditure necessary to bring the 
innovation to consumers.  
 
Alternatively, private incentives to invent for individual inventors may derive mainly 
from signalling to the job market.  While some means of attributing innovation to its 
creator is necessary for this mechanism to work (for example, there may be slow 
spread of information about the innovation to other job market candidates who could 
claim authorship), patent protection is only indirectly relevant to innovation 
incentives in this case.  Indeed, depending on the competitive structure of the job 
market, one could generate either socially insufficient or socially excessive incentives 
to innovate as individuals compete to develop and showcase their talent.   Lerner and 
Tirole (2002) and Lakhani and Wolf (2005) suggest that Open Source code 
developers often invent to develop their own skills
43.  If this private benefit exceeds 
the cost of innovation then the innovation will be provided despite the external 
benefits it might confer on others – and regardless of intellectual property protection – 
even though social and private incentives might remain not fully aligned. 
 
While some argue that the patent system is not necessary, others argue that even if it 
is necessary it is not very effective.  Survey evidence of Cohen, Nelson, and Walsh 
(2000) has indicated that managers do not view patents as very effective at generating 
direct rewards to innovation.  While certain sectors, such as biotechnology and 
pharmaceuticals, appear to get great benefit from patents, various first mover 
advantages (such as learning by doing) are credited with generating greater reward to 
innovation than intellectual property rights in many sectors.  If firms rely on other 
“frictions” such as barriers to entry to generate profits from invention, patents may at 
best be redundant.  On the other hand, Farrell (1995) argues that the “honeymoon” 
period of patent protection may allow these other potentially long lasting first mover 
advantages to get going.  Hence, patents may contribute more to profits than is 
acknowledged in the survey results.  Still, if frictions and not patents are generating 
the rewards, then perhaps we should consider weakening or eliminating patents, since 
the patent system is costly to maintain and may generate few benefits. 
 
An early consideration of the benefits of weakening intellectual property rights in the 
face of frictions is Cohen and Levinthal (1989), who postulate that imitation is not 
“free and immediate”.  Rather, imitation is a skill requiring investment and costly 
                                                 
42 See Middendorf (1981) and Maurer and Scotchmer (2006b).  Giuri et al (2006) provide extensive 
and recent information about inventor behaviour and motivation based on the PATVAL-EU survey. 
43 For a discussion of open source institutions and the possible consequences of patenting for the open 
source community, see Lerner and Tirole (2005). effort to “absorb” knowledge from the “common pool”
44.  If absorption as a function 
is costly and can be separated from the function of contributing to a common pool, 
weaker patent protection can have a benefit.  A weaker patent makes the common 
element of knowledge greater and so allows a larger pool.  As absorption from the 
pool is costly, there is a friction – or barrier -- that can allow profits drawn off the 
larger pool despite weak patent protection. Henkel (2004), in a related model, makes 
an analogy to a juke box: users each individually and privately contribute to the 
musical enjoyment of all despite heterogeneous musical tastes and the positive 
externality they create.  In a similar vein, Harhoff et al (2003) suggest that a pool of 
innovations can contribute as an input to a process of improvement that is fostered by 
the market but also cannot be fully appropriated by competitors due to 
“idiosyncrasies”.  Hence, while each innovation contributes to a public pool, all 
contributors may be able to draw off benefits that exceed their private contributions. 
Weaker  intellectual property rights can spur innovation precisely because of the 
existence of a common pool and the link between weakness and pool size.   In 
addition, the free riding on research by others that is possible in the common pool also 
has the benefit of eliminating duplicative research spending. 
 
Bessen and Maskin (2007) systematise the friction-based argument and show that 
even very small frictions can result in the dominance of a system where all 
information is available to some (exogenous) degree when compared to -- a particular 
variant of -- the patent system.  Bessen and Maskin’s result depends crucially on three 
elements.  First, even if they are small, there are frictions that mean that an inventor’s 
current profit is not reduced to zero immediately by imitation: imitation is costly, 
time-consuming or both.  Second, each pool member is both a contributor to and a 
benefactor of the pool.  In other words, the externality from the innovation runs both 
ways, from and to an inventor
45.  Third, each firm’s private share of a common pool 
of benefits expands with membership in the pool so that “the more the better”.  This 
could be due to the presence of complementarities or network externalities or both.  
Relatedly, there is a benefit to fragmenting research spending across a large number 




Clearly, the assumptions underpinning this model apply much more readily to some 
industries (perhaps information and communication technology) than others (perhaps 
pharmaceuticals).  Further, the benefit of the “open” system is not compared to an 
optimised patent system.  Indeed, Maurer and Scotchmer (2006b) note that the 
assumptions on the efficiency of licensing determines the relative desirability of the 
patent or the open system in their framework
47.    
                                                 
44 See Cassiman and Veugelers (2002) and Bloom, Schankerman and Van Reenen (2007) for 
discussion and references to the vast spillover literature.  Contributions to the common pool are termed 
“outgoing spillovers” of knowledge and absorption is termed “incoming spillovers”.   
45 Belenzon (2006) has presented some evidence that spillovers are “reabsorbed” by the initial inventor 
in the context of sequential or cumulative innovation in a panel of U.S. firms. 
46 In later models of cumulative innovation, we will see that in some models ideas are assumed to be 
“scarce”.  The probability of discovery of an improvement to an innovation may be zero if only the 
original innovator is present because the original innovator may not have the “idea” for the 
improvement.  Participation of an independent entity is necessary to generate further advance after a 
first step.  The Bessen and Maskin formulation is a less “black and white” version of this approach. 
47 For a further model of the benefits of weak or nonexistent patents that relies on frictions, see Boldrin 
and Levine (2003).  
Costly or slow adoption need not imply the dominance of open systems, however.  
Some have modelled the adoption process more fully so as to diagnose where 
precisely the benefits of a patent occur compared to a system of free access.  One such 
benefit to patents could be coordination of the adoption process.  A paper that 
presents a simple version of this is Glachant and Meniere (2008).  Suppose that 
demonstration effects facilitate future adoptions.  Hence, early adopters exert a 
positive externality on later adopters that need not be reflected in early adopter 
behaviour.  On the other hand, an upstream patent holder – as a monopoly holder of 
the technology – will internalise the externality.  Furthermore, an upstream patent 
holder has the tools to control the incentives for adoption by means of inter-temporal 
price discrimination.  Learning spillovers create two types of inefficiency in their 
model: first, even if an early adoption is socially desirable, it may not be privately 
profitable.  Second, there is an incentive to delay adoption so as to benefit from the 
fall in cost.  It may be necessary to both “kick off” the process and ensure that excess 
delay does not occur.  Indeed, to the extent that imitation constrains the ability of a 
patent monopolist to price discriminate over time, imitation can be socially 
undesirable in this model as it can generate sub-optimal patterns of adoption.  Of 
course, while patents are a way to solve this problem of adoption externalities, other 
government instruments could well dominate them.  A monopolist would not 
necessarily coordinate the market in the same way as a social planner would.  The 
point is, however, that free access may need to be supplemented with some form of 
intervention in cases where positive externalities to adoption exist. Earlier papers 
(Katz(1986), Katz and Shapiro (1986) among others) incorporate these same effects 
into more complex models that include strategic effects, as well as extensive 
modelling of the source of the adoption externality (such as a network externality on 
the demand side).    
 
The papers we have examined so far compare a patenting regime to an open system 
without rights.  Anton and Yao (1994) take the polar opposite case of examining how 
well an alternative system of secrecy can reward innovators.  In other words, there are 
no patents, but it is possible – via an unmodelled legal framework -- to keep “iron-
clad” secrets.  Is a system of secrecy enough to generate private rewards to 
innovation? Consider Ms. A, who has an innovation that can be kept secret despite its 
exploitation (for example, the innovation is a process).  Ms. A knows that this is a 
valuable innovation, but potential buyer Mr. B does not have this information.  There 
is a potential market failure in trading this innovation due to asymmetric information: 
B does not want to pay for an innovation of little value.  If the profit potential of the 
innovation relies on sale, we have an under-incentive to innovate.  Ms. A can attempt 
to resolve this failure by revealing the innovation to Mr. B.  Absent patent protection, 
however, revealing the information to Mr. B gives him all the knowledge he would 
need to exploit the innovation without payment to Ms. A.  How can Ms. A possibly 
get any reward for her innovation in this case?   
 
If Ms. A has a secret and reveals it to a purchaser to exploit, she still may be able to 
gather full profits from this secret because she can threaten – credibly -- to expose the 
secret to a third party, Ms. C.  Hence, revelation of the value of the innovation also 
reveals the magnitude of loss under “punishment”: the more valuable the innovation, 
the more value could be lost if the secret were revealed to Ms. C.  More precisely, 
since the innovation is a secret that is not patented, the threat to reveal comes along with it the credible threat not to attach strings to the innovation such that Ms. C. 
would be a restrained competitor.  It is precisely this “weakness” of secrecy that 
makes it a strong negotiating tool.  Further, not only does a threat exist (because Ms. 
C is available outside the private bargaining between Ms. A and Mr. B) but the 
strength of the threat is linked to the value of the technology.  Now, Ms. A would 
always approach Ms. C if the payments were not contingent on profits actually 
earned, but if the license payments are contingent on the gross profits actually earned 
by the licensees, which are assumed to be observable and verifiable, then Ms. A could 
prefer to maintain a monopoly structure as long as she gets a share of the gains.  
Under the relatively mild assumption that the gains from maintaining a monopoly 
structure rather than duopoly are large while the profit gains for Ms. C from accessing 
the same technology as Mr. B are small, secrecy can be associated with trade and also 
a reward to innovators
48. 
 
This argument relies on the parties’ being able to keep a secret so that imitation 
cannot simply destroy the innovation’s value out of the control of the parties to the 
transaction.  Either one can interpret this as an implicit friction in the model that 
allows for profits to be reaped despite the absence of strong property rights or one can 
interpret this as a very robust legal framework enforcing an -- alternative -- trade 
secrecy system.  Clearly, the situation analysed is quite special in that it relies on the 
innovator’s not being able to exploit the innovation herself after revelation, as this 
could affect the negotiations.  Nor can the innovation be reverse engineered based on 
ex post observation of market products.  Hence, secrecy comes with a great deal of 
control in this model, in contrast to the story we told at the beginning of this section 
where secrecy really was not an option.  Their paper suggests, however, that in 
situations where information can be controlled extensively sufficient rewards to 
induce innovation can be created even in the absence of any patenting.  Furthermore, 
a complete lack of patent rights is consistent with some disclosure when this degree of 
control exists.  When we compare a patent system to an alternative of secrecy, we 
should not automatically assume that all information is disclosed under patenting and 
none under secrecy. 
 
Hence, one can make a theoretical argument against patent rights if the circumstances 
are right.  If frictions make patents redundant, or if secrecy is a very effective tool, 
then they may not be worthwhile.  Do the conditions exist for weaker protection 
systems to generate more innovation?  Empirically, this is not yet a settled question.  
Hall (2007) suggests that strengthening a patent system (in terms of lengthening the 
patent term, broadening subject matter coverage or improving enforcement), while 
associated empirically with more use of the patent system, has less clear effect on 
aggregate innovative activity.  Indeed, Sakakibara and Branstetter (2001) found that 
the effect of strengthening patents in Japan had only a very small effect on R&D 
                                                 
48 Formally, for Mr. B to accept the license it must be the case that the (contingent) fee not exceed his 
gains from moving from symmetric duopoly to monopoly, πM – πD.  For Ms. A not to approach Ms. C, 
it must be the case that the fee from B exceed what she could earn from Ms. C (πD – πL), where πL is 
the profit Ms. C would earn if excluded from the innovation,  plus the fee that B would pay knowing 
that the secret would be disclosed afterwards to Ms. C.  If πM + πL > 2πD, as is true for many standard 
industry structures, then a “wedge” exists such that even with a positive fee in the case of disclosure to 
all parties, a parameter range exists where disclosure of a valuable innovation to only Mr. B is the 
equilibrium.    activity
49.  In a cross-country study using a broad measure of patent strength, Lerner 
(2005) finds that strengthening patents has a positive effect on innovation if patents 
are very weak, but a negative effect if patent protection is quite strong, so that 
intermediate levels of protection seem to work best at inducing innovation.  The test is 
a step away from the specifics of the theories discussed here, however, so it is 
difficult to tell what mechanism is at play.  To the extent that there is a linkage 
between innovation and patent strength, the main effect appears centred on a few 
industries where patents tend to be viewed as quite effective, notably pharmaceuticals, 
medical devices and biotechnology (see Arora, Ceccagnoli and Cohen (2003)).  In 
section VI, below, we will consider optimal alternative systems of rewarding 
innovative effort that, combined with free access to innovations, might dominate 
patent systems.     
 
     
V.  Optimal Patent Design: Length and Breadth of Protection 
 
 
We have argued that patents can be seen as generating some kind of social benefits by 
rewarding technical progress, but it may be hard to argue that they generate progress 
optimally due to the deadweight loss they potentially create.  We have also said that 
there are reasons to believe that the reward of a patent could generate either socially 
insufficient or excessive incentives to innovate —in addition to generating the 
deadweight loss.  The argument for moving to no intellectual property protection at all 
or to a system of pure trade secrecy relies on relatively specific assumptions, 
however.  An alternative would be, then, to retain the basic features of the current 
system but re-balance its parameters to generate improved performance.  There is a 
long tradition of papers within this approach.  We will consider first models where 
there is only a single innovation, followed by models of multiple innovations.  These 
models will be primarily in the “reward theory” style.  We will look at models that 
focus on disclosure issues in the final section. 
 
Single Innovation Models  
 
A first set of papers examines a single innovation.  Nordhaus (1969) set the stage for 
this work by suggesting that the length of patent protection should balance off two 
forces: first, for an innovation that will potentially yield benefits to society forever, 
the length of protection should be long (potentially infinite).  Since protection is based 
on exclusive ownership, however, this creates a potential deadweight loss due to 
monopoly pricing.  Minimising this deadweight loss argues for short protection.  The 
optimal length of protection needs to balance these concerns: the longer the protection 
the more innovation is induced, but the worse is the deadweight loss. Suppose that the 
innovation generates a notional maximum discounted social value W  that could be 
earned if it were available for free immediately but a deadweight loss, d, is incurred 
during each period of protection
50.  Let the flow profits for each period of protection 
be π for the innovator.  Profits fall to a baseline level of zero after protection expires.  
                                                 
49Empirical investigation raises the issue of simultaneity between research intensity and intellectual 
property protection. Studies controlling for this link (see Qian (2007)), however, continue to find 
relatively little evidence of a relation between strength of protection and investment activity. 
50 In the earlier notation, if welfare equals d+s+π per period, as before, society obtains only s+π during 







) (   when there are T periods of patent protection, the 
innovation generates net benefits W  – dX(T). This expression is decreasing in T.  We 
can either think of maximising this expression with respect to T or minimising dX(T) 
with respect to T, subject to the constraint that the discounted benefits generated from 
innovation, X(T)π, meet a value, c, required to induce innovation. Noting that X(T)π is 
increasing in T, the solution to this problem is the minimum T that allows the 
constraint to be met. 
 
Of course, any tool affecting monopoly pricing, including competition policy, could 
have a similar effect.  For example, one could invoke a limit on prices (via, for 
example, Article 82(a) in Europe) in each period but allow protection to persist for a 
very long time so that the small return in each period cumulates to the desired reward.  
Hence, the recommendation is that patents should last a long time, but should be 
combined with a strict limit on pricing.  This argument was developed by Tandon 
(1982), where the limit was imposed via compulsory licensing guidelines.  Formally, 
society’s problem is to maximise total discounted social welfare from innovating (or 
minimise the total discounted social costs), where welfare in each period decreases 
with the price premium over marginal cost and the patent expires at time T. If we take 
π to reflect the price cost margin, we have the following social planner’s problem: 
 
                  Max 
T , π
) ( ) ( π d T X W −  (equivalently    Min
T , π
) ( ) ( π d T X ) 
                  subject to the constraint that  
                   
                 c ≤ X(T)π    
 
where c is the value that must be covered to induce innovation.  The difference 
between this formulation and the one above is that there are now two instruments of 
control (the price-cost margin and statutory length) and one, the price-cost margin, is 
an argument in deadweight loss so that we now have function d(π).   Tandon shows 
for the case of linear demand that while the minimand varies proportionately with the 
discount factor X(T), it  is proportionate to the square of the royalty rate (which 
determines the price premium) via deadweight loss.  This makes the length of the 
patent, T, a relatively efficient instrument to compensate innovators relative to the 
price-cost margin.  Commenting on this problem, Ayres and Klemperer (1999) point 
out that lengthening the patent life so as to hold the expected profit constant while 
restricting the monopoly distortion is a form of Ramsey pricing: price is set to 
minimise its distortionary effect while still generating a target amount of revenue
51.  
 
In this model the patent designer wields a great deal of control: both the price-cost 
margin and the length of time during which that margin can be charged are direct 
instruments.  No imitation limits the time during which rents can be earned (so that 
the effective patent length is the statutory patent length) and no imitation or other 
                                                 
51 Allowing a supra-competitive price is like allowing the patent holder to impose a tax.  It could be 
even more efficient to spread a centrally-collected tax over all goods as well as all time periods, but this 
would require intervention by a government body that knows the appropriate target level of reward.  As 
we discuss below, this is an unrealistic informational assumption in many cases.    See Ayres and 
Klemperer (1999) for more discussion.   competitive concerns limit the price-cost margins that can be charged.  We shall see 
later that imitation can modify the model results and the policy implications.   
 
Gilbert and Shapiro (1990) extend this line of research in two directions. First, they 
associate the freedom to charge a large price-cost margin with “patent breadth”.   
Patent breadth can be thought of as a strength index for the patent where a stronger 
patent is associated with higher flow profits.  One interpretation of this would be that 
broader claims could be approved by the patent office, resulting in a larger “exclusion 
zone” around an innovation in product space. This could translate into higher 
monopoly profits if close substitutes are not permissible.  Hence, patent policy now 
consists of two policy instruments: patent length and breadth, where the policy behind 
breadth is interpreted more generally than in Tandon’s work.  
 
Second, Gilbert and Shapiro show that either long, narrow patents or short, broad 
patents can minimise the deadweight loss cost of patent policy, subject to the 
constraint that the innovator earns a reward that induces some desired level of 
investment. Which of these designs is better depends on how welfare is related to 
profits: the relation is assumed negative, but the second derivative can realistically 
take either sign.  It is this second derivative that determines optimal policy.  The 
welfare maximisation problem they consider is the same as above.  Their approach is 
to define the “required profit”, π(T), as the value of flow profit, π, that satisfies the 
constraint for some given level of c. Total welfare, W(T,π(T)) can then be obtained 
solely as a function of T.  They analyse the optimal policy by considering the shape of 
this function, W, as T changes.  This shape is determined by both direct and indirect 
effects: 
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The first term on the right hand side, the direct effect of lengthening the patent, is 
clearly negative due to the deadweight loss per period of protection.  The second 
partial derivative on the right hand side is the direct effect of increasing profits on 
welfare.  This is also negative via the deadweight loss.  The third term, the effect of 
lengthening the protection on the “required” profit level, is also negative, however.  
As a result, the sign of the right hand side depends on the weighting of the effects, 
which is determined by the second derivative of W.  In order for an infinitely-lived 
patent to be the optimal design, we need the entire expression on the right hand side to 









since the patent reward becomes increasingly costly to welfare via the deadweight 
loss in this case.  The reward should be constructed of flow profits that are very small, 
but cumulate to the target reward level that we wish to achieve in order to maximise 
dynamic benefits. Hence, the welfare maximising policy is narrow, long patents.  This 
is essentially the situation analysed by Tandon.  Gilbert and Shapiro show that there 
is, however, a second case where deadweight loss is decreasingly costly as breadth 
rises (the second derivative of welfare takes the opposite sign).  Here, short, broad 
patents are optimal.  The optimal patent design is no longer so clear.  
 It may not be appropriate to consider patent breadth to be an absolute exclusion zone, 
however.  After all, patent protection does not prevent competition from other firms if 
they come up with non-infringing substitutes.  Gallini (1992) suggests that a broader  
patent should instead be thought of as one that is more costly -- not  impossible -- to 
invent around, noting that neither the Gilbert and Shapiro nor the Tandon approach 
really accounted for imitation possibilities.  In this optic, patent policy consists of 
length and breadth – the latter now defined as the cost of imitation.  The constraint we 
have included before
52 is now accompanied by a second consideration that entry will 
occur freely up to the point where the entry cost, E, is just offset by the gains from 
competing as an oligopolist in the industry.  The policy maker must take into account 
that the increased reward earned by patent holders makes entry more attractive.     
Specifically, for a given cost of imitation, lengthening the period of patent protection 
now makes imitation more attractive.  The entry costs incurred are, of course, also 
social costs.  Hence, the social planner’s problem is to create a reward that 
compensates innovators, minimises deadweight loss, and minimises duplicative 
spending.  More formally, let the profits earned by any firm actually entering the 
industry, π, be a continuous and decreasing function of the number of entrants, m.  We 
have entry determined by the condition:  ) ( ) ( m T X E π = .  If we take m(π) to be the 
inverse of this profit function, we have the social planner’s problem: 
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T , π
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                     where we also have  π ) (T X c ≤  
                                        
In other words, we now maximise the surplus net of deadweight loss and entry costs, 
subject to a free entry constraint, and generating rewards sufficient to induce 
patenting.    The patent length that maximises social surplus when E is small enough 
that the threat of imitation is real will be the one that just discourages imitation --
under the condition that the output elasticity with respect to the total number of firms, 
(m+1), does not exceed 1. The elasticity condition means that the relative cost of 
excess entry is large compared to the deadweight loss benefit of an additional entrant.  
If imitation is just discouraged, there is no resource cost to imitation for any given 
level of industry profits.  Also, any given level of industry profits can be channelled 
entirely to the innovator if no imitation occurs.  Hence, the optimal length for any 
given E is capped such that the policy just discourages all entry (m=0)
53.  If both the 
length of protection, T, and the breadth of protection, E, are policy levers of the 
government, then the best policy (when the same output elasticity condition holds) is 
to set E – the direct instrument to control imitation -- large enough to discourage all 
imitation and the length, T, to generate the desired reward for innovation.  Hence, we 
solve for length from the second constraint (assuming no entry will occur), then set 
the entry cost level such that the first constraint generates no entry.  Entry cost, as it 
                                                 
52 The “innovation constraint” in Gallini’s model has a different interpretation.  It is a constraint that 
the innovator uses the patent system rather than secrecy. Hence, while written the same way in our 
notation, the interpretation of c is “the value that could be earned by not patenting” and the constraint is 
now that patenting as a protection option dominates not patenting and using secrecy.  This 
interpretation is in keeping with the emphasis on imitation in the model.    
53 This can be obtained from the entry constraint. both loosens the cap on profits earned by the patent holder and also discourages 
imitators so that all of those profits are channelled to the innovator, is a very efficient 
instrument in this framework, so there is an argument for patents that are optimally 
broad and short.         
      
Klemperer (1990) conceives of patent breadth as a zone of exclusion in product space 
around any given invention: the best current design is protected by patent so imitators 
only offer inferior products. Hence, increased breadth has the cost of redirecting 
“imitation” away from desirable designs and into less desirable products, inducing a 
welfare loss for any consumer who buys a “knock-off” rather than a more desirable 
product.  In this sense, the formulation extends imitation considerations to envisage 
the possibility of (inferior) imitation and a zone of exclusion.  Breadth is interpreted 
as a portion of a product spectrum reserved for a patent holder
54 with imitation 
supplied competitively (so that the best non-infringing design is supplied “at cost”).  
Now, the social cost includes not only the deadweight loss due to a price distortion on 
the patented product, but also the transportation costs for consumers who “travel” to 
the patent boundary to purchase there, and any additional reduction in demand for 
travelling customers due to the cost of transport.  Given that imitation is redirected so 
as to occur outside the zone of exclusion, the pattern of consumption induced by 
breadth as a tool may be undesirable for society as a whole since it may result in 
consumption switched to the “wrong” product variety.  Call losses from “travel” τ(z).  
We now think of the social planner’s problem as minimising total discounted social 
costs: 
 
            Min
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             c = X(T)π(z)    
 
where z is the width of the exclusion zone of the patent, and both deadweight loss and 
profits, π, vary with this width.  Combining this constraint into the minimand, we can 
reformulate this problem as minimising the ratio of patenting’s social cost per unit of 
money spent with the patent’s lifetime set to be the minimum that satisfies the 
innovation constraint: 
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For very wide patent breadths, the social cost is primarily a simple monopoly 
distortion since little substitution actually occurs.  For very narrow patent breadths, 
however, there is high competitive pressure from close substitutes so that deadweight 
loss is low.  On the other hand, substitution occurs readily for narrow breadth so that 
the cost of travel contributes significantly to social cost.  Optimal patent design is, 
therefore, very sensitive to the pattern of consumer preferences.  If all consumers have 
                                                 
54 As patents are specified in technical terms, there is no precise legal equivalent of such an exclusion 
zone in product space for many patents.  Still, one can think of some patents that are quite close to this 
specification.  For example, a patented shoe (US Patent number 5255452) used in stage illusions 
includes claims on both lace-up and strap-on variants.  To the extent that a “knock off” would have to 
use an attachment mechanism other than the standard ways a shoe attaches to a foot, this could create 
the sort of inferior knock-off in product space that this model envisages. identical transport costs, the patent holder must set prices low enough that no 
consumers switch.  If prices are set such that no switching occurs, however, the only 
social cost that is relevant to the social planner’s decision is the standard deadweight 
loss.  As we have just seen, this is minimised by setting the breadth as narrowly as 
possible.  In contrast, if all consumers have identical reservation prices for their most 
preferred variety (so demand is inelastic), then the patent holder optimally charges 
consumers this (common) reservation price. All consumers purchase, but there is zero 
deadweight loss.  If the patent breadth is set as wide as possible, then all industry 
profits accrue to the patent holder and travel costs are minimized.  Hence, wide 
breadth minimises the social cost per unit of monetary incentive for the patent holder.  
In all cases, the patent lifetime is set so as to just satisfy the constraint that the patent 
holder have the incentive to create the innovation in the first place: narrow patents 
must be long; broad patents must be short
55. 
 
These three papers, Gilbert-Shapiro (1990), Klemperer (1990) and Gallini (1992), 
taken jointly suggest that there is no clear-cut answer to whether larger or smaller 
breadth is better for social welfare.  Gilbert-Shapiro’s result that narrow, long patents 
are associated with a decreasing and concave flow social welfare function is 
intriguing, but they show that this is not the only case.  Indeed, Gallini and Klemperer 
provide examples where social welfare can be convex or simply increasing in patent 
breadth.  These different shapes give rise to drastically different optimal policies.          
 
Two general comments have been made about this type of patent design story.  First, 
most of these models take the identity of the original innovator as given. Denicolo 
(1996) notes that reduced breadth may be accompanied by more entry by researchers.  
If more entry into the research stage is accompanied by the presence of inefficient 
producers, insufficient product variety, or duplicative research costs, then clearly 
whether or not increased breadth is desirable on balance will depend on how these 
costs and benefits weigh up in social welfare. His paper generalises the reasoning of 
the previous models to obtain sufficient conditions under which maximum or 
minimum patent breadth is optimal when the identity of the original innovator is 
determined by means of a patent race.  In his formulation, then, we have: 
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where I, the “incentive” to win, is now a the average of the profits a racer could lose  
weighted by the probability of losing, and a measure of the profit gain from patent 
protection, weighted by the probability of winning. The term I is a function of the 
flow profits due to the patent holder.  Denicolo postulates that narrower breadth is 
associated with a smaller profit for winners compared to losers.  Hence, denoting a 
                                                 
55 Waterson (1990) also takes a spatial exclusion zone interpretation of patent breadth.  His result is that 
flow welfare can increase in patent breadth due to better locational decisions by firms.  In other words, 
if an imitative entrant unconstrained by patent breadth would choose to locate socially too close to the 
incumbent firm for business stealing reasons, an exclusion zone around the first entrant can benefit 
both innovators and society.  For the innovator, an exclusion zone ensures a greater degree of product 
differentiation, hence attenuating competition, and for society it ensures greater variety, reducing 
“transport” cost losses. patent breadth index by k, we have the incentive to win and deadweight loss both as 
positive functions of breadth.  Narrower breadth tends to bring about more 
competition, but what this means in terms of social welfare is ambiguous, since social 
welfare could decrease (due to duplicative research expenditure in the R&D race or 
inefficient production) or increase (due to reduced deadweight loss) and could have 
almost any second derivative with respect to breadth.  The paper takes a reduced form 
approach to this, showing that the optimal patent policy of long, narrow patents or 
short, broad patents depends on the second derivative of flow welfare with respect to 
breadth as before, however these second derivatives are obtained.  This paper shows, 
then, that the general reasoning of the earlier models is not affected by the 
incorporation of racing concerns even if the precise breadth and length cutoffs might 
be. 
 
Second, Gallini (1984) has pointed out in earlier work that licensing activity has the 
significant benefit of allowing market participants to economise on duplicative 
research expenditure.  Surely, an incumbent facing a threat of entry by imitative 
spending should have an incentive to contract ex ante with the potential entrant to 
save on the imitative expenditure.  Both parties are at least as well off under this 
scenario.  This sort of insight should suggest that introducing licensing along with 
imitation concerns could dramatically change the conclusions we draw on the length-
breadth trade-off.  The precise effect depends on the modelling.  Consider the 
Klemperer (1990) and the Gallini (1992) formulations.  In the Klemperer model the 
entry cost is zero, so licensing activity would not alter the basic conclusions: the 
patent-holder would potentially have to license an infinity of firms in order to avoid 
imitation, and this it cannot do.  On the other hand, in the Gallini paper, the entry fee 
is both positive and central to the analysis.  Ex ante licensing by the patent-holder 
allows the entry fee of imitators to count as income for the innovator.  Hence, it 
becomes an innovation incentive for the patent holder, but does not enter as a welfare 
loss because it becomes a pure transfer between market participants
56.  This alters the 
problem considerably, so that the set-up really becomes one of minimising 
deadweight loss subject to an innovation constraint that now includes licensing 
revenue from would-be imitators.  This can weaken the argument for broad 
protection.  Hence, when we include licensing considerations, there is a stronger 
argument in this model for long, low breadth patents.      
 
Cumulative Innovation Models  
 
All the above papers were set in the context of a single innovation, albeit with 
possible imitators or knock-offs.  This is a simple and instructive case, but not 
necessarily a commonly observed one.  Two cases of multiple innovation streams 
which raise issues quite distinct from those discussed above have been analysed in the 
literature in response to this concern.  The first of these cases is discussed in this sub-
section.  It is the case of cumulative innovation: where innovations build on previous 
advances.  This case raises new challenges to patent design in the following sense.  
Suppose that, without a first innovation, the idea for an improvement cannot exist.  
The fact that the first innovation creates the seeds for its own improvement means that 
                                                 
56 Indeed, in the context of arguing for an independent innovator defence, Maurer and Scotchmer 
(2002) argue that imitation costs should not determine patent design, as their impact should be 
minimised by privately organised licensing activity.  We will see damages used to (optimally) 
compensate innovators for infringing in later models in this survey. there is a positive externality running from the first innovation to the second.  This 
externality need not be internalised if the follow-on innovator is distinct from the first 
innovator.  How to best divide a single profit stream so as to both reward the first 
innovator for this externality and induce follow-on innovation is the focus of this 
literature. 
 
More precisely, following Scotchmer (1991, 2004) and using our earlier notation, 
suppose that one firm has generated an innovation that could give rise to further 
innovations: without the first innovation, the follow-on would not be possible.  For 
example, think of a basic innovation that opens an entirely new field of research that 
had heretofore not been contemplated.  The first innovation generates a positive 
externality by its revelation, as it identifies the new field.  From society’s perspective, 
the full benefit of the first innovation includes creating the possibility of a stream of 
innovations that cumulate to produce benefits, ultimately for consumers.  If these 
innovations are separately held by independent inventors, however, we face the 
challenge of simultaneously generating full incentives for the first innovator to “kick 
off” the innovation path and also generating full incentives for any subsequent 
improver to produce follow-on innovations.  Suppose, for example, that the second 
innovation generates a positive total discounted social value of W2 on its own.  If we 
award W2 entirely to the second innovator, then we create full incentives to invest in 
the follow-on.  However, we still face the difficulty that we should attribute both the 
direct value of the first innovation, W1, as well as the value of the second innovation 
(which would not have existed without the creation of the first innovation), W2, to the 
first innovation.  Hence, to maintain full incentives to create the first innovation we 
need to allocate W2 twice.  Otherwise, innovation incentives will be socially too low.     
 
Establishing exclusive rights can partially address this “double allocation” problem.  
If a single innovator has control over the rights to an entire stream of innovations 
there is no need to allocate W2 twice.  A social planner or any other single inventor 
would internalise the externality and so we would not have any trouble achieving 
efficiency.  This solution is straightforward if the same innovator is able to efficiently 
obtain both the initial innovation and its follow-ons.  However, if a single entity does 
not have the ability to create all inventions that stem from the information revealed by 
a single invention, property rights may be used to allocate the benefits of the 
externality so as to achieve the desired technical progress despite the participation of 
multiple parties.  This is where the possibility of licensing matters.  Licensing makes 
it possible for a first innovator who has exclusionary rights to follow-on innovations 
but not the ability to develop them to trade access to those rights for a benefit flow 
from the second innovation.  As long as enough benefit is left to the second innovator 
to cover the costs of creating the second invention, it is in the interests of both 
innovators to agree access and also to conduct research to generate the second 
invention.  In this way, the presence of exclusive property rights does nothing to 
impede the pace of innovation.  To the contrary, property rights facilitate net benefit 
transfers from future innovations to the first innovator, improving the incentive to 
develop innovations in the first place. 
 
Using the terminology of O’Donoghue, Scotchmer and Thisse (1998), we must now 
distinguish in our patent design problem between patent breadth as protection from 
pure imitation (“lagging breadth”), and patent breadth as protection from different – 
and perhaps better quality – follow-on innovations (“leading breadth”).  In the single innovation case, only  the former was relevant.  With cumulative innovation, 
however, the leading breadth granted to the first innovator determines whether a 
follow-on innovation infringes the original patent and therefore can be barred from 
sale by the first innovator.  A patentable innovation outside the scope of (leading) 
protection is non-infringing, while one inside this scope infringes.  A broad patent on 
the first innovation implies, then, that a follow-on innovator would need the express 
agreement of the first innovator to exploit the follow-on.  Hence, the first innovator 
can use the agreement to allocate the externality back to the first in the chain of 
innovations. 
 
Green and Scotchmer (1995) enunciate and formalise this basic insight.  Consider the 
case of a “research tool” where the value of the first innovation on its own is nil
57. If 
there is only one potential innovator, then the fact that there is an externality running 
from innovation 1 to innovation 2 creates no inefficiency in the decision to innovate 
as long as the patent runs long enough that the total profit of the innovator exceeds the 
total development cost. While the innovation constraint becomes c1+c2≤ X(T)π2, the 
problem is essentially unchanged from the single innovation case. The innovation 
stream should be undertaken whenever W2 – c1 – c2 > 0 and policy must set patent 
length to allow the monopoly profits to cover the full cost of investment, c1+c2.  
Breadth has no new role in this story.  If the inventor of the second innovation is 
different from the first inventor, however, then we must be concerned not only with 
the total profit but also its division, as both inventors must obtain a large enough 
percent of the earnings to cover the development cost.  Now we have two innovation 
constraints: the first innovator’s earnings over the patent period must cover 
investment cost c1, and the second innovator’s earnings must cover investment cost c2. 
Because the earnings may now include transfers between the parties, bargaining is 
now the focus of the analysis.   
 
Leading patent breadth can both affect the bargaining positions of the parties to the 
technology access agreements (licenses) and the need of each party to “come to the 
table” in the first place. As the first innovation has zero value on its own, the first 
innovator would never invest unless some of the second generation profit was 
transferred to it.  Such a transfer can occur via a licensing contract, but the timing of 
this agreement matters: whether this contract is executed before (ex ante) or after (ex 
post) the second innovator invests c2 can determine what terms will actually result 
from bargaining between the two parties
58. This is because ex post agreement allows 
the second innovator to be “held up” for (sunk) cost c2.  Hence, the bargaining 
equilibrium potentially depends both on the breadth of the patent and on the licensing 
regime that is permitted.     
 
Suppose that only ex post licensing is permitted and while both innovations are 
patentable, the patent breadth is such that the second innovation infringes the first.  In 
this case, either innovator could potentially prevent the second innovation from 
coming to market.  If the firms fail to agree a license, no transfer is possible and the 
                                                 
57 There is some evidence that research tool patents have increased over the last twenty years, in 
particular in the area of biotechnology, making this a pertinent example.  See Walsh, Arora and Cohen 
(2003).   
58 One could also think of very early agreements, before innovation 1 is created.  This would be closer 
to a research joint venture, on which there is a considerable literature.  See Tao and Wu (1997) or 
references included in Miyagiwa (2007).  first innovator cannot benefit from the second innovation.  Further, the second 
innovator stands to lose its development cost but obtain no return for it if the 
innovation is blocked by the first patent holder.  On the other hand, if the firms agree 
to split the surplus evenly, the first innovator potentially earns half the profits from 
the follow-on innovation, as does the second innovator.  Hence, ex post licensing 
results in profits (½Π2– c1, ½Π2-c2) for the first and second innovator, respectively, 
and if π2 is a per period reward, the cumulative reward for a patent of length T is Π2 = 
X(T)π2.  is the discounted profit from the follow-on innovation
59.  Because the second 
innovator earns only half the profits from innovation 2, innovation may be deterred  
when [½Π2 < c2 < Π2] -- due to “hold-up”.  Hence, ex post licensing does not fully 
resolve the reward problem at both the levels of innovation one and innovation two. 
Furthermore, if we narrowed patent breadth so that the second innovation no longer 
infringed the first, innovation 1 would never be undertaken at all: the first innovator 
would have no basis on which to capture value in exchange for its cost of investment, 
c1.   
 
An ex ante agreement can resolve this problem by allowing the first innovator to 
commit to a lower licensing fee by means of negotiating at a time when the second 
innovator has yet to sink development cost c2.  The second firm can ensure itself a 
payoff that covers its investment cost.  Further, both innovations will obtain enough 
surplus to be innovated as long as profits cover the entire costs, Π2 > c1 +c2.  Hence, 
the combination of ex ante licensing and large patent breadth for the first innovation 
generates desirable investment incentives. If the second innovator knows Π2 and c2 
before investing, the optimal policy is infinite breadth, in fact, so that all follow-on 
products infringe the basic innovation.  This minimizes the second innovator’s profit 
in an ex ante agreement.  In other words, the situation where the second innovator’s 
product infringes puts it in the weakest bargaining position, allowing the first 
innovator to give it only just enough to induce it to innovate. This “outsourcing” in 
turn ensures that profits are channelled to the first innovation as a reward for the 
externality it generates.   
 
The authors comment that the legal status of ex ante licensing agreements such as the 
one we’ve just discussed is questionable under competition policy since one could 
claim that they could amount to ex ante collusion.  On the other hand, if one restricted 
all licensing to be ex post, one would have to recognise that this could restrict the 
cases where the follow-on innovations are developed or could require that patents be 
lengthened in order to increase the reward of the patent holders sufficiently to satisfy 
their innovation constraints.  In other words, we would need to “scale up” the term Π2. 
Whether or not this is desirable depends on the deadweight loss associated with the 
patent period.  Notice that, since the effect of the stringent infringement standard and 
ex ante licensing is to obtain a better distribution of licensing revenues – which are a 
pure transfer – the change in “breadth” has no direct effect on deadweight loss.  Any 
deadweight loss is via the patent term, and this can be minimised while inducing both 
innovations to occur when the first patent holder is given broad control and ex ante 
licensing ability.         
 
                                                 
59 The underlying story could be that Nash bargaining determines an even split in the licensing 
negotiations. The emphasis of this argument is on the importance of infringement as the salient 
aspect of “breadth” in a cumulative setting.  This, however, is not the only policy tool 
that could be relevant to the allocation of surplus between initial and follow-on 
innovators.  Scotchmer (1996) investigates how the division of profit is affected by 
the patentability of the second product.  This plays a role when the identity of the 
second innovator is not known ex ante. 
 
Again, consider the case when the first innovation has no stand-alone value and 
assume that the follow-on innovator need not be the same as the first innovator. Let 
the second innovation infringe the first.  The first innovator would potentially issue an 
exclusive license (before research into the follow-on has occurred) to a single agent, 
hoping to collect profits so as to provide a payoff to its own basic innovation.  If the 
second innovation is separately patentable, however, then any independent second 
innovator (regardless of whether it was a licensee) can block the follow-on’s sale. 
Suppose, then, that two independent innovators potentially could invest c2, each 
innovator potentially patenting the follow-on with probability ½.  The first and second 
innovator must then bargain ex post over surplus Π2 regardless of whether the second 
innovator had previously received a license.  Assume the any bargaining parties split 
this surplus evenly so that each receives Π2/2.  A potential second innovator who 
obtains a license faces a probability of ½ of obtaining the follow-on and earning Π2 
and a chance of ½ of losing.  In the latter case, the license to the first innovation is 
useless without a license to the second.  Hence, the licensee ends up with expected 
profit  ½Π2 + ½Π2/2-c2.  The entire stream of innovation is now expected to generate 
3Π2/4 – c2 for the licensee.  The firm that was a non-licensee earns nothing if she 
loses the race for the follow-on, but can bargain for Π2/2 if she wins, which she does 
with probability 1/2.  Hence, a non-licensee expects to earn Π2/4-c2. The winning bid 
for the exclusive license, the difference between these, is only Π2/2 which is less than 
Π2 –c2 whenever the losing bid would be positive.  If, on the other hand, the second 
innovation is not separately patentable, an independent follow-on innovator has no 
exclusionary rights.  As a result, the first innovator never bargains with a non-
licensee, and non-licensees never invests.  The first innovator can earn the entire net 
stream of returns in this case, Π2 – c2, as a payment for an exclusive (ex ante) license. 
 
We see, then, that the first innovator receives a lower payoff when the second 
generation innovation is patentable than when it is not.  Patentability of the second 
generation product has two drawbacks in this story: it potentially encourages 
duplicative R&D costs for the follow-on product – reducing the surplus available to 
the bargaining parties -- and also it transfers some of the profit stream towards the 
follow-on inventor.  We have an argument based on these two papers for very strong 
rights to seminal innovations but relatively weak protection for any follow-ons.    
 
Of course, policy-makers would generally have more instruments than patentability to 
work with.  As before, we could consider the value generated by the patent, Π, to be 
an increasing function of patent term, T.  The length of the patent serves to scale the 
reward.  In this case, we could examine how patentability and patent term could work 
together to create rewards for the innovators.  If there is no deadweight loss to the 
patent, then this yields an answer that infinite protection is optimal.  More generally, 
let there be a deadweight loss to protection that we wish to minimise, subject to an 
innovation constraint.  Then to cover the first innovator’s cost c1, patent life could 
now be adjusted upwards when the second generation is patentable in order to induce the first innovator to invest in the first place. Combining this possibility with our 
previous observations on patentability, ex ante licensing tends to allow for shorter 
patent lives, as the rewards can be adjusted in the licensing contract to internalise the 
externality before any costs are sunk.  Even in the case of efficient contracting, 
however, patentability of the second innovation tends to require longer patent lives to 
ensure that innovation incentives are maintained.  If a longer patent period is 
undesirable because of the deadweight loss, this structure of the patent can be 
dominated by a structure with strong novelty and non-obviousness requirements for 
cumulative innovations.  Under this policy, relatively small steps (clear follow-ons) 
would often not be patentable
60. 
 
One way to think of cumulative innovation is to think that innovations now move up a 
quality ladder so that improvement innovations can make the earlier innovations 
obsolete.  A process of Schumpeterian “creative destruction” occurs as we move up 
this ladder.  This process, however, can render the statutory patent life irrelevant since 
innovations are eclipsed before the statutory length of protection is reached.  It is not 
clear, then, that statutory length can have the same “scaling” function that we have 
attributed to it.  In fact, it is no longer clear that we can make the strict separation 
between length and breadth of protection as independent policy tools that we did 
before.  Now, small leading breadth is no longer consistent with an infinite stream of 
monopoly rents.  While the notion of lagging breadth is well-defined, leading breadth 
and the statutory length of protection combine to determine an expected effective 
length of protection.  Another way of seeing this is to say that the statutory length 
may scale up profits if improvements are slow to emerge, but cannot necessarily be 
relied upon to create such scaling if improvements come quickly.  One might then 
need to rely on other tools, such as leading breadth, to do this. 
 
A second comment on the cumulative innovation models we have reviewed is that the 
previous models assumed that the “roles” of first and second innovator were clearly 
assigned.  In point of fact, the same firm may sometimes function as a follow-on 
innovator and may sometimes be the first innovator.  The distinction between first and 
second  inventors then becomes blurred even if the distinction between first and 
second innovations is clear.  Despite the prominence of bargaining, the role of patent 
design may not, then, be to transfer profits from one “type” of innovator to another: 
all firms are potentially of all types.  Instead, the aim is to balance total profits to 
innovation for each innovator against deadweight loss.  In this sense, we move back 
towards the trade-offs found in the single innovation literature.    
 
O’Donoghue, Scotchmer and Thisse (1998) examine such a quality ladder setting 
where each firm can take on both leader and follower roles and where statutory length 
and leading breadth interact to jointly determine patent rewards.  In the phrasing of 
Hopenhayn and Mitchell (2001), the patent system in a quality ladder framework 
establishes a clock that is running on monopoly rights for lower quality firms as well 
as a promise of rights for the firm currently holding the high quality innovation.  
Suppose that the magnitude of each innovation’s quality improvement over the 
                                                 
60 There are limits to this argument, as delays in research plus a short patent on the first innovation 
mean that the second innovation does not infringe for at least some of its life.  Furthermore, if it is not 
clear that follow-ons depend heavily on the first innovation, the externality argument gets weaker.  In 
both these cases, the argument for patentability of the second innovation gets stronger.  See Scotchmer 
(1996) for more discussion. previous frontier technology is v, and this also indexes the profitability of the 
improvement until it is supplanted by the next innovation or the patent expires, 
whichever comes first.  Then each improvement generates a potential value to society 
of v/r – c, where c is the development cost of the improvement and the improvement 
generates value forever discounted at rate r.  On the other hand, if creative destruction 
occurs each period, the innovator only earns v for one period, after which the product 
becomes “obsolete”.  This private reward may be insufficient to cover development 
cost c.  We have insufficient innovation incentives since each innovation creates value 
that benefits society forever, but the innovator collects this value only for a single 
period.  Indeed, even if statutory patent life is infinite, an innovator will never have 
full incentives to innovate as long as creative destruction occurs at some rate. 
 
Define leading breadth in this framework as a quality margin, k, such that if an 
improvement possesses a quality margin less than this it infringes the patent.  Now 
consider alternative patent protection designs in this framework.  Suppose first that 
for the duration of a patent, all improvements infringe (so that leading breadth is 
infinite).  Ideas for improvements arrive at some rate to independent agents.  Since ex 
ante licensing is permitted, all improvements where the net value is positive will be 
made but will incur a licensing fee that splits the surplus between the improver and 
the holder of the infringed patent.  If patents last a number of periods, T, each 
innovation v would then earn “direct” discounted profits X(T)v, but would also earn 
licensing revenues from improvers -- and would result in licensing payments to earlier 
infringed patents -- during its life.  Call net licensing revenues L(T,h), where h 
describes the history of previous quality improvements.  Hence, the innovation 
constraint now becomes c≤X(T)v+L(T,h).  We can define v(T) as the schedule of 
quality steps that satisfy this constraint with equality for different patent terms: this 
set of steps defines the marginal innovations that will be invented.  
 
Consider now the alternative design where all patents have infinite life but limited 
breadth so that only creative destruction causes them to “expire”.  Any improvement 
within margin k creates profits until it is supplanted by a non-infringing improvement: 
that is, an improvement lying outside margin k.  Infringing innovations will be created 
as long as the profit surplus they create is non-negative due to ex ante licensing.  
Hence, during the period of protection, the patent holder earns revenue composed of 
direct returns plus licensing fees and payments. Until a non-infringing innovation is 
discovered, this innovator will remain the market incumbent, earning the revenue 
stream.  Formally, if the discounted profits of a patent lasts some set of periods, t, 
before being replaced by creative destruction, but this duration t is distributed 
according to a Poisson process with arrival rate Γ (reflecting an uncertain research 
process), the authors assert that the expected net discounted profit from any 
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.  Define v(k) as the quality step that just sets this 
expected net discounted profit equal to zero for patent breadth k.  All innovations at 
least as large as v(k) will be created, even if they infringe and so require a license, so 
that v(k) is the marginal innovation under the alternative regime.   
 
The marginal innovations are not necessarily the same under the two policies, giving 
rise to differences in the rate of innovation and the research expenditure under the two 
protection regimes.  As protection increases towards infinity on both dimensions, 
breadth and length, however, the rate of innovation tends to approaches the social optimum.  Hence, the flavour of the result is similar to earlier cumulative innovation 
models where there is a tendency for very strong protection to be optimal. 
 
As we have noted, however, the two policies we have just considered are not 
equivalent.   To induce the same rate of innovation the first policy is associated with a 
shorter effective patent life.  In the first policy, the binding dimension of patent 
protection is its statutory length so that a patent holder has claims on future 
innovations.  The same level of investment incentive can be created with relatively 
short protection in this case.  Rewards to the innovation are high, so statutory 
protection can be short because the total reward quickly surpasses the cost of 
innovation.  On the other hand, broad short patents potentially create deadweight loss 
by concentrating the rights to use innovations in a few hands with little “close” quality 
competition, recalling the single-period models.  In the second policy, the binding 
dimension is patent breadth, so that follow-ons tend not to infringe, and effective life 
must be determined as a consequence of breadth.  In other words, the claims on future 
generations of innovations are quite limited in this case.  To achieve the same initial 
investment incentive, the effective patent life must be adjusted to be longer for 
narrower breadth and shorter for larger breadth
61.  When demand is inelastic, the 
lower R&D costs that come with the latter policy make it preferable since the longer 
patent period does not create deadweight loss.  If there is a deadweight loss associated 
with the period of patent protection, then the first policy can be better as patent 
protection is shorter.    
 
Translating the policy in this paper into patent statutes is, as usual, tricky.  One way to 
think of operationalising the policy of very large leading breadth but short statutory 
patent length is to think that every technology that relies on prior art (i.e., any patent  
that cites an earlier patent) infringes that prior art for the duration of those patents.  A 
way to think of the policy of narrow leading breadth but long statutory length patents 
is perhaps by applying a strict interpretation of the doctrine of equivalents (where 
equivalence is in terms of quality step), which can have the effect of granting very 
limited scope to patent claims beyond what is actually enunciated in the patent claims 
themselves
62.   
 
As O’Donoghue (1998) points out, the above result on leading breadth relies on a 
well-functioning licensing market. When efficient licensing is not possible, (perhaps 
because it is difficult to identify subsequent innovators as a practical matter or 
because transactions costs are high, may obtain a stronger argument for the 
importance of a patentability requirement to obtain optimal innovative behaviour in 
such a quality ladder framework
63.  Note that we considered infringement standards in 
the O’Donoghue, Scotchmer and Thisse framework, but we did not consider whether 
                                                 
61 Horowitz and Lai (1996) anticipate this point using patent length and the frequency of “creative 
destruction” to determine the incentives to produce a “big” innovative step.  Their work interprets 
length as statutory length, while O’Donoghue et al (1998) make it clear that effective length can be 
determined by either statutory length or leading breadth. 
62 For a recent legal decision in this area, see Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 
535 U.S. 722 (2002). 
63 See Gallini (2002), Merges and Nelson (1990) and Heller and Eisenberg (1998), among others, for a 
discussion of impediments to licensing.  Comino et al (2007) show that both early innovators and 
followers may benefit from decreased breadth when licensing is inefficient because the first innovator 
cannot observe whether follow-on innovators have already undertaken R&D activity, which decreases 
licensing’s effectiveness as a tool.   follow on innovations should be separately patentable.  O’Donoghue reasons that, if it 
is assumed that an unpatentable innovation earns no profits, then there is no point in 
targeting unpatentable innovations in research.  As a result, a larger patentability 
requirement can induce firms to target larger innovations -- since these are the 
profitable ones.  If these big steps take longer to accomplish, then this policy comes 
hand in hand with increased rewards to innovation since larger steps tend to prolong 
the effective period of incumbency.  As a result, the reward to research can be 
increased by a tough patentability requirement. In other words, patents promote, but 
also retard research by effectively discouraging innovations inside a quality 
threshold, and so a patentability requirement can modify the chosen step size on a 
quality ladder.  Imposing a patentability requirement so that firms target innovations 
larger than the social optimum can, in fact, improve dynamic efficiency.  This is the 
case because firms tend to invest too little when they can be eclipsed by followers.  
The patentability requirement tends to increase R&D incentives, which has a first 
order effect on welfare, while the adjustment to the innovation “step” has a second 
order effect when that step is close to the social optimum.  The point is, then, that 
patentability requirements have “bite” if licensing functions poorly. As an empirical 
matter, Hall (2007) notes that there is evidence that firms direct their research towards 
patentable rather than unpatentable subject matter so the underlying assumptions of 
the model seem to receive some support
64.    
 
In the cumulative innovation papers considered so far, it would be best if a single firm 
had the ability and resources to carry out the entire stream of innovation itself.  If a 
single agent were responsible for the entire stream of innovations, the externality 
would be internalised.  This is the nub of the tendency for these models to favour very 
strong protection for seminal contributions.  However, this single firm benchmark 
neglects the potential benefits and costs of having several potential innovators “race” 
for the rights to a given “idea”.  If “ideas” are not public knowledge, then these 
potential benefits are irrelevant: each innovator pursues his or her own “ideas” 
without the fear of being beaten to the punch by a rival.  If, however, research ideas 
have a significant public knowledge dimension, then the potential benefits and costs 
from “racing” cannot be neglected in patent design.  This issue is addressed by 
Denicolo (2000) who points out that, because of potential duplication of efforts and 
the incentives to pre-empt, the private market may over-provide innovation.  It may 
be better, then, to reduce the reward to innovation.  This effect can, then, dampen the 
optimality of heavily rewarding firms that create seminal innovations that was present 
in earlier models.  In fact, once we introduce the possibility that firms race for 
innovations, aligning the private and the social reward to innovation without 
considering duplication may be the wrong policy as the losses from duplication may 
be very large.   
 
                                                 
64 In a model similar to O’Donoghue (1998), Hunt(2004) finds that the inventive step requirement for 
patentability that maximises the rate of innovation is at an intermediate level.  While increasing the 
inventive step requirement makes the marginal discovery unpatentable (so that R&D expenditure is 
“wasted”), it prolongs the reward to patentable steps since discoveries exceed the patentable threshold 
less frequently.  This increases the incumbency period.  If exogenous parameters are such than an 
industry tends to invent frequently, increasing the inventive step has a large marginal effect on rents as 
they are discounted little.  Hence, “high tech” industries -- with frequent innovation – optimally require 
a more stringent inventive step than those with infrequent innovation.             Maurer and Scotchmer (2002) address the issue of racing by arguing for an 
independent invention defence to patent infringement (currently available for 
copyrighted material).  In other words, they suggest that racing concerns could be 
addressed by another policy tool: that of allowing a firm that has conducted 
duplicative but non-imitative effort to commercialise its invention.  This has the 
benefit of reducing deadweight loss by introducing more competition into the final 
market.  It also puts a “cap” on earnings and so reduces entry into the race, which 
dampens duplicative expenditure.  If the social benefit of reducing this deadweight 
loss exceeds the negative impact on the innovator’s incentives to invent, then it can be 
socially beneficial to allow independent inventors to co-exist in the market.  Of 
course, determining whether invention was truly independent or simply imitative 
could be a daunting task.   
 
Summarising the papers examining patent length and breadth in the cumulative 
innovation case, one can suggest the following conclusions. First, there appears to be 
a relatively strong argument for protection from literal imitation (large lagging 
breadth).  Leading breadth has more qualified support: its benefits rely on the 
assumptions one makes about the scope for licensing.  If licensing is fully flexible and 
efficient, then a strong argument for leading breadth exists.  If licensing possibilities 
are restricted, then a much more limited case for leading breadth can be made. Strong 
patentability requirements receive some support when licensing does not function 
well.  When duplicative investment as a result of racing is taken into account, there is 
an argument to be made against very large rewards for any invention.  Indeed, racing 
considerations generally limit the argument for strong patent rights.       
 
Complementary Innovation   
 
Lemley and Shapiro (2007) suggest that it is not just the cumulativeness of innovation 
that creates a difficulty in allocating an externality.  If patents are complementary, 
with synergistic benefits such that the sum of the patents adds up to more than the 
separate parts (for example if a product is made possible only by the combination of 
the patents) then we can also get socially incorrect levels of innovation investment.  
The reason is that there is both an externality and an investment coordination problem 
that did not exist before.  In the case of cumulative innovation, there was a (positive) 
externality that ran only one way, from the first innovation towards the follow-on.  
Now, the externality runs two ways, as each innovation is a necessary “piece of the 
puzzle” in the final composite good.  Further, one innovation does not necessarily 
completely precede the other in time.  That is, when innovations cumulate, the follow-
on investment does not begin until the first innovation exists. In the case of 
complementary innovation, however, all investments could potentially occur 
simultaneously.  It could, then, be possible that multiple innovation equilibria exist: it 
could be an equilibrium for all innovations to be created or for none of them to be.  
Hence, as a result of the two-way externality and this difference in timing, there is a 
pure coordination problem in investment to be solved that was not present before.  
 
If pooling a variety of patent rights is necessary to create a final product and the 
licensing transaction is costly, Heller and Eisenberg (1998) make a general point that 
when multiple, separate, rights holders must be brought on board to create social 
value, innovation may be underprovided due to transaction cost considerations.  They 
identify this as a “tragedy of the anticommons”, in contrast to the more classic tragedy of the commons.  While this issue existed in the cumulative innovation case, it may be 
more severe in the case of products that read on a wide number of patents in a variety 
of fields simply because the relevant patents may not be filed over time but may 
instead be simultaneous and so in force for a long time.  If licenses are not negotiated, 
then there is a potential for an innovative good never to make it to market in the first 
place, resulting in social loss
65.     
 
Shapiro (2001) examines formally the case where multiple rights owners contribute to 
a new product or process, creating a “patent thicket” that a new product could 
potentially infringe.  Shapiro draws an analogy to the “Cournot complements” 
problem where a manufacturer must purchase n essential inputs from n distinct 
monopolists.  Suppose that each i = 1,…n  separate firms owns a patent that is 
essential to the production of a final product to be sold on a competitive market.  Each 
firm sets a per unit royalty, ri, for its patented “input” and each patented “input” is 
produced at marginal cost oi.  The final good price, p, will be composed of some 
manufacturing cost for the assembler plus the sum of all the royalty payments charged 
for access: p = .  If each of the royalties is set independently and non-
cooperatively, then for price elasticity of final demand ε the mark-up of the price over 
the marginal cost of “input” production will be: 
∑ = +
n
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which is n times the standard monopoly mark-up.  The final price of the manufactured 
good is higher under this vertically separated structure than it would be if a single 
vertically integrated firm provided (all) the inputs and output.  It is also higher  than 
the price that would be charged by a competitively organised final product market, 
which purchases from a single, monopolistic supplier of all essential inputs.  The 
profitability of the innovation as a whole falls because individual firms fail to 
internalise a (negative) pricing externality.  As a result, there is a socially undesirable 
reduction in the research incentive. 
 
Since the Cournot complements problem penalises members of the industry as well as 
consumers, one would expect to observe institutions to have arisen to limit this 
behaviour.  Where high technology products rely on technological standards that are 
composed of multiple essential patents owned by different parties, the patents are 
often required to be licensed at “reasonable and non-discriminatory” (RAND) 
royalties. While this can be seen as a way to limit royalty overcharges, Schmidt 
(2008) comments that it would be very difficult to implement vague words like 
“reasonable” in any systematic way and, indeed, quotes Swanson and Baumol (2005) 
who state that “It is widely acknowledged that, in fact, there are no generally agreed 
tests to determine whether a particular license does or does not satisfy a RAND 
commitment”.   
 
                                                 
65 Walsh, Arora and Cohen (2004) and Walsh, Cho and Cohen (2005) suggest that at least in the case of 
research tools in the biomedical industry, the “anticommons” problem may not be very severe 
empirically.   The Cournot complements line of reasoning we have just developed clearly yields 
social efficiency arguments for various policies.  Schmidt (2008) examines horizontal 
merger among patent holders as a remedy.  He also allows for market power 
downstream so that a double-marginalisation problem exists on top of the 
complementarity problem.  Under sufficiently flexible licensing contracts (such as 
two-part tariffs), merger solves both inefficiencies.  He notes, however, that Layne-
Farrar and Lerner (2008) find that all the patent pools they investigate used linear 
royalties.  When he restricts contracts in this way, horizontal merger among inventors 
continues to perform well, but vertical integration does not.  The reason is that each 
vertically integrated entity does not internalise the externality it exerts via its royalty 
rate charged to other (vertically integrated) entities.  To the contrary, by raising the 
royalty, each entity can raise rivals’ costs.  Further, each entity suffers from some 
double-marginalisation for the patents it must buy in.   
 
If one assumes that the set of patents in the “thicket” is not “fixed”, but is 
accumulated over time due to continuing research, Noel and Schankerman (2006) 
hypothesise that a reasonable reaction to the Cournot complements problem could be 
for firms to accumulate large patent portfolios. Indeed, they find some empirical 
evidence for excessive incentives to patent in order to “hoard” in the software 
industry
66.  Related work by Arora et al. (2001), Hall and Ziedonis (2001), and von 
Graevenitz et al (2008) finds that the recent growth in patent applications can be 
attributed to defensive use
67 of patents in “complex” industries – those where patent 
thickets are present.   
 
Alternatively, allowing complementary patents to be traded as a “package” for a 
single price rather than traded separately could yield gains.  Hence, we might wish to 
treat patent pool agreements – agreements among multiple patent holders to aggregate 
a set of patents among pool members or license as a package to non-members – 
leniently when they involve complementary patent rights
68.  Cross licenses could 
serve the same purpose
69.   
 
Not all industries are equally susceptible to complementarity problems.  Cohen et al. 
(2000) classifies industries according to whether they are “complex” – so that value is 
derived from complementary components -- or “discrete”.  If this is the case, targeted 
industrial policy towards patent pools or merger could address the complementarity 
problem.  Alternatively, one could think of the complexity of an industry as the result 
of patent design: if patents are granted very narrowly, then many complementary 
“bits” would necessarily contribute to almost any product.  Perhaps the appropriate 
                                                 
66 They hypothesise that a larger patent “arsenal” also strengthens the bargaining position of an 
inventor and reduces transaction costs as the number of potential negotiations fall.  Dewatripont and 
Legros (2008), in an analysis of patents’ contributions to standards, appeal to a version of a Shapley 
value to justify the relation of bargaining strength to the proportion of patents owned.   
67 This defensive use can include litigation concerns, which will be discussed below. 
68 See Schmidt (2008) for a summary and comments on recent US policy moves towards a “rule of 
reason” approach to whether patent pools must contain only complementary patents or whether 
substitutes can be included as well.   Layne-Farrar and Lerner (2008) give a history of patent pool 
policy in the US.   
69 For examples of patent pools and their diversity (from mega pools comprising a broad-based 
governance structure for huge numbers of patents to small pools that amount to no more than a few 
multilateral contracts establishing a way to consolidate patent rights and a rule to divide up licensing 
revenues) see Merges (1999). policy response is to make patents broader, then, to reduce the cases where 
complementarity issues arise. 
 
Both of these solutions could be hasty, however.  The reason is that both assume that 
the degree of complementarity is not a choice variable for the producers.  Lerner and 
Tirole (2004) take the opposite tack suggesting that, while the Cournot analogy 
provides a good starting point, it is often difficult in practice to pinpoint whether a 
patent is a complement or a substitute for another.  The complementarity of patents 
may be less an unchanging “objective” characteristic of the patents than a 
characteristic of how a particular manufacturer optimally decides to combine 
technologies into a final product.  Worse, these characteristics may change over time 
as technology and its applications progress.  This could call our policy responses into 
question.  
 
To sketch Lerner and Tirole’s argument, consider a case where users can purchase 
patent “inputs”, supplied by n  upstream owners, each of whom owns one patent.   
Users combine these patents in various ways to create a valuable product.  Users will 
do this in a surplus maximising way, which necessarily takes into account the input 
cost (i.e., the price at which the patent is licensed).  Users may create surplus either by 
using a subset, m, of the n  available patents or the entire available set.  More 
precisely, a user can combine patents to create value θ+V(m),  where  V is an 
increasing function of the number of patents actually used, m ≤ n, and the values θ are 
distributed according to some cumulative distribution function, G, over the user 
population.  Hence, just using a single patent creates value, but the set of all patents 
creates even more value and further, users are heterogeneous in how much value they 
derive from the final “product”.   
 
A patent owner can license these innovations to users at a price, P.  User demand will 
be determined by the value extracted from the patents, θ+V(m), net of the price at 
which they are sold, P.  For low P, it may very well be the case that the net value 
extracted from the patents is highest when all n patents are bought.  This would be the 
case when the price for each patent, pi, is less than the value added of the m
th patent, 
V(m) – V(m-1), for all m.  Note that, when all patents will be used, a rise in the price 
of one patent will tend to decrease the attractiveness of the final good as a whole 
because its price will rise.  Hence, a price rise for patent i decreases the demand for 
other patents.  This means that the patents are demand complements at low prices: the 
rise in the price of one causes a fall in the demand for another.  On the other hand, it is 
possible for the prices of a patent to exceed its marginal contribution over some base 
number of patents.  In this case, only a subset of patents will be purchased and 
combined to create end value.  For example, if n = 2 and each patent is priced above 
the contribution of a single patent, θ+V(1), but below the marginal contribution of the 
second, V(2) – V(1), then only one of the patents will be purchased and used.  In this 
case, a rise in the price for one patent causes the demand for the other patent to rise 
because use switches to the cheaper of the two.  Hence, the patents are substitutes.   
 
In setting a license fee, then, a patent owner needs to take into account two effects.  
First, she needs to think about whether the patent will be retained in the “basket” of 
patents that are purchased.  Second, she needs to take into account the effect of her 
own fee on the final price of the good that the patents are used to create (and hence 
the final demand for the “basket” of patents).  If the second effect is dominant, then under non-coordinated pricing, each patent holder exerts a positive externality on 
other patent holders when she lowers her price since she raises demand for the entire 
“basket” of patents.  Price for the basket will fall when this externality is internalised, 
so that coordinated “pool” pricing reduces user price and raises welfare in general.  
This argument recalls the Cournot reasoning, above.  On the other hand, if the 
dominant effect is the first, noncoordinated pricing may induce an incentive to lower 
each patent price so as to “steal business” from other patent holders.  This can create 
welfare gains to noncoordinated pricing over pool pricing if patents are sufficiently 
substitutable.  Hence, the recommendation for patent pools is more nuanced: we only 
want to be lenient when an endogenous “complementarity effect” (and not some 
exogenously determined “complementarity characteristic”) is dominant. 




As we said earlier in the chapter, a major function of the patent system is to 
disseminate information.  One could think of this as transforming private ideas and 
their embodiment into public knowledge by means of the patent disclosure 
requirement.  Hence, the degree to which ideas are “private” is a policy instrument of 
the patent system as well as a choice variable for firms that can select between 
patenting their innovations and exploiting them as trade secrets.  The degree to which 
information will actually be revealed in a patent system and the degree to which it 
will be withheld in a secrecy system is, however, debatable as we will see below.    
 
Maurer and Scotchmer (2006) emphasise the coordination role of the disclosures, 
arguing that one of the benefits of disclosure comes from informing the inventing 
community generally of who is working on what, which results have been obtained 
and which have not in the same way that publishing serves the academic community.  
In a sense, the disclosure requirement of patent law creates a “public repository of 
knowledge”
70.  If a first inventor could easily identify the best qualified “next” 
inventor, she could disclose any relevant information to subsequent inventors 
privately for a fee, thereby profiting from the increased efficiency of the research 
path.  Without this information -- with unanticipated applications of technologies 
coming from unlikely sources -- a public repository of knowledge may be the most 
efficient way to allow those with the skill and creativity to make the next step to 
actually contribute.  To the extent that licensing actually occurs, allowing 
technologies to work together, the “public repository” should also allow inventors to 
specialise in their area of technical competence.  This coordination benefit becomes 
more significant the more efficient the licensing market is.   
 
Denicolo and Franzoni (2004) add to the argument for the coordination benefits of the 
patent library by suggesting that the patent disclosure can reduce – perhaps 
unintentional -- duplicative research effort.  Whether the disclosure is a tool that 
actually publicises this information in a form that can be interpreted and accessed 
readily is, perhaps, more debatable.  Bessen and Meurer (2008) have argued that, in 
fact, many infringement cases are inadvertent.  This could suggest that potential the 
coordination benefits of a library are not being realised fully.  
                                                 
70 Aoki and Speigel (1998) suggest that the recent move in the US towards earlier disclosure may have 
significantly sped up the development of technology by improving the available research base.  
Even if competitors are already aware that a potentially profitable investment 
opportunity exists, the information in the disclosure can affect the nature of the race 
towards discovery within this general area. Disclosures make the information 
structure in an R&D race a choice variable for the participants.  For example, suppose 
that Ms. A possesses an innovation that is secret and that gives her a hint about how a 
future innovation could be designed.  Ms. A knows that Mr. B. is working on the 
same problem, but has not yet obtained such an intermediate result.  If Ms. A 
discloses this information via obtaining a patent, she gives up her lead in the R&D 
race.  This can create a large disadvantage to the disclosure system for users.  On the 
other hand, Ms. A. can commercialise her innovation without fear of imitation due to 
the protection the patent affords on her intermediate step. In a system where taking a 
patent is voluntary and secrecy is always an alternative means of protecting the gains 
to innovative effort, the trade-off faced by Ms. A. suggests that not all innovations 
will be patented and disclosed.  Only those innovations will be patented for which the 
trade-off goes in the direction of large gains to commercialising under patent 
protection and little loss in terms of an R&D race.  Hence, a patent system with 
disclosure only ensures that some innovations may be disclosed, not that all 
innovations are disclosed.  This, too, can hamper the coordination role of the patent 
system.   
 
If disclosure has a benefit, perhaps society would be better off in a system where 
secrecy is not an option.  Aside from the difficulty of enforcing such a policy, there 
are reasons why allowing firms the option of patenting could be beneficial.  If firms 
have an observable choice between secrecy and patenting (so that it is possible to 
observe that a firm is keeping a secret, but it is not possible to know what the precise 
nature of the secret is), then the act of patenting can have signalling value.   An early 
contribution by Horstmann et al (1985) takes the view that the simple act of patenting 
signals information accrued by the inventor during an R&D stage.  If the information 
thus revealed makes imitation around the patent more profitable for a competitor, the 
propensity to patent falls.  Forcing full revelation (so that the signalling function is 
compromised) is not necessarily welfare improving due to welfare losses from 
increased imitative R&D expenditure
71.   
 
Further, we have already seen that Anton and Yao (1994) show that under certain 
conditions a limited amount of revelation will occur under secrecy, as inventors reveal 
their innovations privately to a limited set of licensees.  Hence, a system of secrecy 
will be associated with some disclosure.  Anton and Yao (2004) examine which types 
of innovation may tend to be patented rather than kept secret in a signalling 
framework.  Their model shows that it is the smaller innovations that will tend to be 
patented (and disclosed), rather than the larger ones.  This could potentially lower the 
benefit of the patent disclosure since only small steps will appear in the “repository of 
knowledge” that the patents create.  More precisely, the authors assume that the 
enabling information in the patent need not, in fact, allow rivals to completely 
duplicate an innovation.  Innovators may choose to disclose a lot of information in the 
patent document, thereby convincing rivals that innovations are quite significant.   
Such disclosure triggers imitative behaviour, of course, and may result in damage 
payments from the imitation. Innovators could also opt for trade secrets that disclose 
                                                 
71 More recently, Langinier (2005) develops this line modelling. very little but also give no rights to damages in the case of imitation.  A separating 
equilibrium exists where small innovations are patented, fully disclosed in the patent 
document, and are not imitated; large innovations are kept secret and are not imitated 
because no information was disclosed.  This model assumes a weak enablement 
requirement so that partial disclosure is possible.  The informational requirements 
apart from the specific information in the enabling requirement are quite large: it must 
also be possible to know what proportion of a total amount of information was 
disclosed in order to derive the equilibrium in the first place.  The basic point they are 
making, however, is that as long as secrecy comes along with sufficient control, it can 
generate selective disclosure.  Further, as long as patenting is a choice and not an 
obligation, only certain types of innovation will be disclosed via patents.  If the 
patented innovations are not the most socially valuable types to disclose, then the 
patent disclosure does not function optimally
72.    
 
The enablement requirement, while clearly linked to how much information is 
disclosed in the patent system, is not the only tool that affects the disclosure function.  
How should other aspects of the patent be designed to obtain the most out of 
disclosure?  Scotchmer and Green (1990) examine the novelty requirement for 
patentability and how this can be managed to promote disclosure.  Disclosure may be 
well-served by a weak novelty requirement for patentability where even small 
improvements can be patented.  If the uptake of patents on these intermediate steps is 
good, scientific progress building on known art can be rapid.  This advantage is 
undermined if firms do not choose to patent the interim innovations in order to avoid 
giving away valuable information; however, a strong novelty requirement does 
nothing to help resolve this problem, as no further disclosure will occur under this 
regime.  The novelty requirement also affects the incentives in the patent race, 
however.  A weak novelty requirement could have the effect of ensuring that the 
market is populated with products that are relatively close substitutes and, hence, are 
not very profitable.  While a strong novelty requirement could lead to slower 
discovery by any one researcher, the larger reward that it promises to those who 
remain in the race could lead to increased entry into innovative activity.  Entry could 
ultimately speed up final discovery.  Patenting is voluntary, however, and the fact that 
the weak novelty requirement opens the possibility that close substitutes would be 
provided does not ensure that patenting occurs.  Scotchmer and Green show, to the 
contrary, that firms choose to suppress the interim discovery precisely when profits 
would be eroded.  Hence, the weak novelty requirement does not necessarily lead to 
low rewards.  One can, however, make a signalling argument for a strong novelty 
requirement: if the novelty requirement is weak, a firm can infer something from the 
very suppression of an invention when patenting was a viable option.  The inference 
that an invention has been discovered but suppressed can discourage innovation 
investment by a rival who thinks she has fallen behind in the race
73.  If the novelty 
requirement is strong, there is no option to patent so there is no signalling value in the 
                                                 
72 Anton and Yao (2002) examine the case where ideas can be partially disclosed so that some 
information can be revealed, but other information can be traded privately as unpatented “know how”.  
In their 1994 paper, where partial disclosure was not possible, the licensing contract offered by the 
purchaser to the inventor only had to eliminate the incentive to disclosure the information to a third 
party.  In Anton and Yao (2002), disclosure can also be used to signal the extent of other – undisclosed 
– knowledge that the seller possesses.  The undisclosed knowledge will be bid for by competing buyers 
and not all knowledge may be disclosed in the equilibrium of interest. 
73 See Gill(2008)  for more discussion of strategic disclosure as a tool to make a competitor drop out of 
an R&D race. observation of no patenting.  Of course, a weaker enablement requirement -- so that 
information in the patent disclosure need not be very complete -- could undermine 
this argument as the overall disclosure benefit as well as the signalling value of 
patenting would fall
74.     
 
In related work with a somewhat different legal interpretation, Baker and Mezzetti 
(2005) and Bar (2006) develop the idea that the disclosure of intermediate steps in a 
patent race affects prior art.  This means that disclosure of intermediate steps can 
affect the patentability of subsequent innovations because the subsequent innovations 
must be novel when held up against this prior art.  Disclosures may be optimal in their 
framework even if they are not accompanied by patent protection.  As prior art is built 
up of any public information (patented or not), the leading firm must make a greater 
improvement to obtain an innovation viewed as sufficiently novel to patent.  Hence, 
laggard firms may wish to disclose in order to prolong the race towards a prize that 
gets ever farther away: the disclosure buys them needed time to attempt to pull ahead 
in a stochastic R&D race framework.  The decision to patent, then, comes hand in 
hand with a decision to make the R&D stage a more complete information race.  The 
exact interaction between the information, the exclusive rights, and the patentability 
criteria determines whether firms race more or less intensely and so whether 
discovery comes sooner or later. 
    
Matutes et al. (1996) focus on the distinction between a patent’s disclosure of both the 
embodiment of an innovation and the idea underlying it but the patent’s protection 
applying only to the embodiment.  Further, in the other models we have reviewed, it is 
supposed that all parties realise that a secret is being kept and all have a rough idea of 
its nature so that there was a lot that could be inferred from “no information”.   
Matutes et al. take the opposite tack of assuming that until the seminal information is 
revealed, competitors have no clue of its existence.  Hence, “no information” does not 
act as a signal.  Instead, they focus on when to disclose when disclosure both allows 
the innovation to be commercialised under patent and also initiates a race for the 
remaining unpatented applications of the underlying idea.  Sketching their “waiting 
game”, let it take one unit of time to develop each profitable application (claim) of the 
basic insight. Then an innovator has an incentive to keep the insight secret by waiting 
a period of time before introducing any of its applications, as this postpones the time 
others realise that a fertile insight is available to be built upon, and so start developing 
applications of their own.  In other words, once the “cat is let out of the bag”, m 
potential entrants will potentially start to develop any applications that have not 
already been developed and protected by patent by the first innovator.  Hence, there is 
a positive externality of the disclosure that is not internalised by the first innovator: 
the first innovator will use trade secrecy to postpone this race to grab applications, 
even though waiting is socially harmful because it delays commercialisation of the 
applications. From the initial inventor’s point of view, the impatience to 
commercialise the applications that already have been developed creates an incentive 
to patent early to weigh against the incentive to prolong the period of development “in 
secret”.  More precisely, if A potential applications exist and the initial innovator 
                                                 
74 In a related point, Aoki and Spiegel (1998) have suggested that the recent move in the US towards 
earlier disclosure can significantly speed up the development of technology by improving the available 
research base.  Shapiro (2004) suggests that early disclosure may have been associated empirically with 
less strategic activity that could be undesirable, such as so-called “submarine” patents.    waits λ units of time before disclosing, then when each application earns discounted 
profits of π the innovator would choose to wait according to: 
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They investigate the extent to which limiting this kind of waiting to access the patent 
system in the first place can be addressed legally by granting claims on applications 
that are not yet fully worked out.  This has been termed granting a “license to hunt” 
by means of a patent.  Granting a limited license to hunt increases the incentive to 
disclose the first step because if creates an entry barrier – a zone of exclusivity -- into 
a set of potentially profitable innovations
75. Indeed, under this lens, leniency on large 
patents, with many (non-overlapping) claims, submitted at an early stage has a 
welfare benefit of speeding up useful disclosure
76.  Of course, the disclosure is 
assumed to be useful here: potential researchers face no difficulty in wading through 
and digesting reams of claims
77.   The paper suggests that delay that facilitates 
“hoarding” may occur in the case where accessories could follow on to an original 
“platform”
78.   
 
Hence, both the enabling disclosure in the patent and the act of patenting per se carry 
information that affects imitative and innovative behaviour.  While the positive 
externality conferred by the enabling information has social benefit, private parties 
may be expected to disclose less than the socially optimal amount.  This limits the 
value of patents as a “repository of knowledge”.  Secrecy does promote some limited 
disclosure, although the disclosure may be private to only licensing partners.  On the 
other hand, the standards of enablement, the novelty requirement, the role of previous 
patents in the definition of prior art, and the leniency in granting claims on 
prospective applications are all available tools to affect the amount of disclosure 
actually obtained by the patent system.  More complex strategic reasons to decide to 
patent or not also exist and can be used to manipulate the behaviour of rivals.  This 
latter function derives from the optional nature of patenting, and the existence – in 
some cases -- of commercially viable alternatives.     
 
E.  Alternatives to a Patent System: Optimal Procurement of Innovation 
 
                                                 
75 The claims in new and quickly developing fields can be rather speculative, in particular in some 
pharmaceutical areas according to Bigdoli (2009), ch. 216 “Innovation and Intellectual Property”. 
76 The idea of giving prospective protection on claims that are not fully developed recalls the work of 
La Manna (1994), discussed above, where there is a benefit to reserving territory to a single patent-
holder before investment occurs, although diffusion benefits are not a concern in that model. 
Kitch(1977) identifies a “prospect function” for patents when they are granted early in development.  
See Merges and Nelson (1990) for a discussion of this view.     
77 Chen and Iyigun (2006) incorporate concerns about delay in patenting and disclosure into a model of 
economic growth.  Duplicative research expenditure is less of a concern in their framework, so 
imitation will be observed in their optimal patent design, in contrast with most of the papers reviewed 
here.   
78 Noel and Schankerman (2006) finds evidence for hoarding in complex industries.  No 
complementarity is required to obtain hoarding in the Matutes et al model, as the accessories are 
assumed to be independent “pots of gold” for whoever innovates them.   The discussion of the preceding section took for granted that some system rather like 
the current patent system would be used to generate innovation incentives.  We 
considered modest modifications of this system, using existing tools such as statutory 
patent length, infringement standards, a patentability requirement, the enablement 
requirement, and the interpretation of claims to achieve that goal in the most efficient 
way.  If we were to start from a blank slate, it is not clear, however, that patents as we 
know them would be our chosen optimal scheme to “promote the progress of science 
and the useful arts”.  Indeed, many other schemes have been and are still used to 
achieve this goal
79.     
 
Wright (1983) develops the point that a patent-like system might not be the best 
mechanism in a fully optimised model of innovation incentives.  Instead of using the 
monopoly mechanism to create a reward for innovation, the state could instead simply 
award compensation in the same amount directly to the innovator and obtain a welfare 
gain. In other words, whatever the reward available through the patent system, 
transferring that reward to the innovator as a lump sum rather than as a result of a 
market distortion achieves the same innovation incentives with less deadweight loss. 
He refers to this sort of payment made by an authority and conditional on the delivery 
of a completed advance as a “prize”.  Hence, if the value and cost of the innovation 
are publicly observable, and if the funding of the prize is relatively non-distortionary, 
then the prize system will dominate the patent as an incentive mechanism.  Wright 
goes on to suggest that subsidies could dominate patents as well.  Competitive bidding 
can be used to contract out the research before its completion to ensure that only the 
most efficient researchers are used.  While this removes the normal racing incentive, 
this system can achieve higher welfare than a patent if timely innovation can be 
induced via performance requirements.      
 
Information is rarely this good.  In particular, it may be more realistic to assume that 
the authority awarding the prize has less information about the value of any candidate 
innovation, let alone its cost, than the innovators themselves.  In the presence of 
asymmetric information, Wright shows that any one of the three mechanisms -- 
patents, prizes or contract research -- could be the best mechanism.  Patents have the 
advantage that they delegate the decision of which investments to put forward to the 
“informed party”, the inventor.  If the inventor is the one who knows which 
investment will generate the most value, but the sponsor does not (without incurring a 
cost), this represents an improvement over a prize system that would require the 
government to “pick winners”
80.  This gain can outweigh the deadweight loss 
associated with the patent system.  Further, a prize has a drawback of its own in the 
case where innovative activity can be conducted by many parties since the prize does 
not limit entry.  Hence, it suffers from generating excessive research expenditure due 
to the “common pool problem” that was discussed above as part of the reward theory.  
One alternative to reduce this incentive for duplicative expenditure is to reduce the 
size of the prize.   If the funding body has poor information on the value or cost of the 
                                                 
79 See Scotchmer (2004) for an in-depth review and history of other schemes to promote innovation, 
including prizes, subsidies and direct procurement. 
80 Shavell and Ypersele (2001) show that a combined reward cum patent system always dominates a 
pure patent, taking as an example a case where innovations can be ranked by their value and the prize 
is set so as to induce the lowest innovation “type” (value) to switch from patent protection to the prize.  
This reduces deadweight loss and does not suffer from a problem of picking winners, although it does 
require enough knowledge about possible innovation types to be able to set this minimum reward.   research, however, this system might only elicit low value ideas while leaving the 
level of compensation too low to elicit research in high value output.  Contracting out 
research potentially avoids excessive research expenditure, but it may not result in 
sufficient incentives to create value in the first place, precisely because it eliminates 
research competition.  In other words, while the incentive to “race” for the patent may 
be too large, the incentive to invent at all for a single, designated contract researcher 
may be too small.  The contract would need to be designed to ensure that the best idea 
was selected for funding and that invention incentives were maintained.  The 
possibility of designing such a contract depends on what is observable to the funding 
body and on the credibility of the promise to pay for deliverables
81.    
 
When information is asymmetric, Gallini and Scotchmer (2002) point out that 
designing an incentive mechanism for innovation can be broken down into three 
“steps”.  First, there is the decision problem of whether a project should be 
undertaken.  Second, there is the delegation problem of which firms should undertake 
the investment and at what rate. Finally, there is the funding problem of how to 
reward the investments. A set of papers applying mechanism design machinery to 
innovation incentives have begun to address these three points.  
 
One approach has been to incorporate a modified “prize” into the patenting system by 
means of patent buyouts.  Kremer (1998) suggests a system that effectively awards 
prizes but does not rely on the planner’s identifying the value of potential innovations 
beforehand.  Let a period of time elapse during which firms hold their patents in the 
normal way.  After this elapsed time other firms, besides the one that patents, are 
likely to have an idea of the private value of the innovation.  This information can 
then be marshalled by the planner to create a reward for the innovation using a second 
price sealed bid auction to elicit payments for the right to the innovation from the 
private parties.  In order to maintain the incentive to bid, with small probability the 
patent will be transferred to the highest bidder in exchange for the winning bid.   
Otherwise, the innovation is placed in the public domain. In either case, the price 
determined by the auction would be paid as a prize to the original patent holder by the 
government out of general tax funds (or some other budget associated with the office 
responsible for the buyout mechanism).  In fact, to reflect the difference between the 
private and social value of the patent, the government could apply a positive mark up 
to the winning bid when making its payment.  Whether to put a patent up for auction 
(or “buyout”) would be at the discretion of the patent holder.  If the bids are relatively 
low, the patent holder can refuse to sell.  Clearly, this proposal is meant to 
complement the patent system
82, not replace it as the initial award of a patent is 
essential to the mechanism.  The proposed approach will dominate a pure patent 
system as long as the administrative costs of the buyout and the cost of public funds 
are not too high.   
 
                                                 
81 See Scotchmer (2004) for a discussion of contests for sponsored research.  The more knowledge the 
planner has about what the target of research should be, its value, or its cost the wider the set of 
alternative instruments to patents.  Maurer and Scotchmer (2004) discuss a variety of procurement 
mechanisms, including auctions, prototype contests , grants, and matching funds.  Trajtenberg (2002) 
provides extensive discussion of how these alternative government supports have been used to 
advantage in Israel.   
82 Brunt et al (2008) observe that prize awards, even non-pecuniary ones, can have a large inducement 
effect for innovation when used in conjunction with a patent system; however, the prizes studied are 
not buy-outs.  Rather they are awards to scientists to undertake research that can lead to patents.  Hopenhayn, Llobet and Mitchell (2006) investigate buyouts in a quality ladder 
framework.  Formally, the authors first consider the case when an innovator’s “type” 
– their innovative ability -- is observable.  They show that the optimal patent system 
can take an “exclusive” form where a quality leader above some threshold ability 
receives patent rights while all other previous innovators’ rights terminate. More 
precisely, suppose that a social planner can make promises of durations, k, in the form 
of a set of time periods during which no other innovation may be implemented.  In 
each period a new innovator arises.  In such a case, allocating monopoly power to the 
current innovator potentially curtails the planner’s ability to allocate monopoly power 
to future innovators.  Furthermore, allocating a period of exclusionary rights today 
may postpone the benefits one could earn from a superior innovator in the future.  The 
planner’s problem needs to take into account several constraints.  First, innovators 
will choose the quality increment v  that they target as a function both of their basic 
ability, θ, (their “type”) and the duration of their monopoly power, k, so that we have 
v(k, θ) when they are assumed only to earn profits during the k periods that they are 
allocated.  Second, the planner must keep her promises in the sense that the 
cumulative duration already allocated, K, must equal the duration promised to all 
innovators who have already implemented their innovations.  Hence, if kp(θ)  is 
allocated to previous innovators in each period, we have  ∫ = θ θ θ d g k K p ) ( ) ( , where 
the distribution of types is described by density function ) (θ g .  Third, the total 
duration allocated in each period to previous and current innovators, kp(θ)+kc(θ) 
cannot exceed the total discounted time horizon 
β − 1
1
 when discount factor β is used.  
Finally, the rule by which K changes in each period is that, during a single period 
kp(θ)+kc(θ)  is allocated, but at the same time a single period elapses so that 
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θ c p k k K  is the balance of duration that remains next period.   
Under all these constraints, the social planner grants kp(θ) and kc(θ) so as to maximise 
the expected present value of all future innovations, W, given that K units of time 
have already been allocated.  This value is composed of the contribution of the 
innovator to social welfare, which is the contribution of the quality improvement over 
its development cost, chosen optimally as a result of the policy set by the planner, 
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subject to the constraints discussed above.  Given the appropriate sorting assumptions, 
they establish sufficient conditions under which the optimal patent system is of a form 
whereby innovators who report type above some threshold θ obtain exclusionary 
rights, which begin immediately upon grant without delay.  In other words, when 
kc(θ) is positive, kp(θ) is set to zero. Conditional on not being replaced, a current rights 
holder retains unchanging protection.  Notice that the proposed mechanism addresses the problem of whether investment 
should occur at all as well as the delegation problem identified by Gallini and 
Scotchmer (2002) in the sense that only firms with types above a threshold ability find 
it profitable to undertake investment.  It also designs a system of rewards consistent 
with this.  The mechanism is similar to O’Donoghue, Scotchmer and Thisse’s (1998) 
result of limiting (and constant) breadth and infinite statutory length.  The framework 
is much less tied to legal institutions of the existing patent system, however, so it is 
difficult to translate the assumptions of the model into precise legal principles that are 
currently observed.       
We have not discussed yet how buyouts enter the Hopenhayn et al model.  When it is 
not possible to observe type θ, the “exclusive patent system” we have described can 
be decentralised into a mandatory buyout system. The buyout takes the form of a 
payment to the current market leader to displace her, as well as a specified buyout 
amount that the new leader would accept to be displaced by another.  The buyout also 
involves a transfer fee, paid to the granting authority, and potentially varying by the 
innovator’s type. In order to find the buyouts that result in the same duration, kc(θ) as 
in the optimal patent system described above, the authors derive a revelation 
mechanism such that an innovator of type θ will report his true type. The payment that 
implements the optimal policy can be shown to be separable into two parts.  The first, 
σ(θ), is a function only of the innovator’s type  and the second, γ(K), is a function only 
of the cumulative protection, K.  The authors propose that a new innovator must pay 
buyout γ(K) to the existing (exclusive) patent holder and a fee f(θ) to the planner that 
entitles him to a buyout in the amount γ(kc(θ)) in the future.  Since the fee entitles the 
patent holder to a buyout, the fee includes a component dependent on the innovator’s 
type (σ(θ)) and the future buyout fee.  In this way, the innovator buys out the current 
innovator, while the fee he pays to the planner incorporates a payment that will 
eventually be “refunded” by a future innovator.  This buyout scheme is simple in the 
sense that it involves only a list of fees and buyouts.  The authors point out, however, 
that for such a system to be derived, the planner must know a great deal about the 
structure of the innovation system, including the cost of development and the 
distribution of the types.  Furthermore, the model analyses only a single and definable 
“ladder”.  In point of fact, it may not be at all clear which ladder(s) a particular 
innovation is on.  In terms of whether the patent system could be amended to look 
more like the proposed mechanism, the authors note that optimal pre-specified and 
efficient licensing payments can potentially serve some of the same functions as a 
buyout organised by sponsors and could effectively implement the optimal system.  
This would put us back much closer to the earlier literature on optimal patent design 
with efficient licensing.   
 
Kremer (1998), in his discussion of his own proposals, documents many practical 
problems with buyout schemes.  A few examples will suffice to give an idea of the 
difficulties of moving towards such a system.  First, as emphasised by Wright(1983), 
the “true private valuations” revealed by this system should include business stealing 
effects.  As we discussed above, the private value may exceed the social value when 
business stealing effects are present.  Kremer’s “mark-up” reflecting the gap between 
social and private values could sometimes be negative if business stealing were 
present.  More generally, this mark-up would depend on the innovative industry’s 
structure as well as the nature of the patented information.  Referring to his own 
“voluntary buy out system”, Kremer suggests that there is a lemons problem in the sense that firms that know that a new innovation in their own research pipeline will 
eclipse an existing innovation might tend to be the ones putting their innovations up 
for sale in order to exploit this.  Hence, there is an underlying signalling problem that 
could affect the performance of the system and would affect its design.  On the other 
hand, a mandatory system, such as Hopenhayn et al’s formulation, avoids this by dint 
of being mandatory.  Third, the optimal system depends on how patents interact: 
whether patents are complements, substitutes, or on the same -- independent -- quality 
ladders. We have already argued that the substitutability or general interaction 
between patents is not clear cut in many cases, following Lerner and Tirole’s analysis.  
Fourth, auction-based buyout mechanisms can only be as good as the auction 
mechanism on which they rely.  No auction mechanism is perfect.  For example, the 
second price sealed bid auction is vulnerable to collusion amongst participants.   
Finally, there are knotty political economy issues associated with making a buyout 
system widely available to all patents, even if one takes for granted that the economic 
issues can be solved.  For example, if it were widely publicised that frivolous patents 
– of which there appear to be many
83 -- were receiving payouts from the government, 
those paying into the general tax funds might not react well
84.     
 
Scotchmer (1999) and Cornelli and Schankerman (1999) suggest pairing the patent 
system with other incentive tools, focussing on subsidies.  Both start from the idea 
that one wishes to preserve the desirable self-selection characteristics of the patent 
system, while not sacrificing the advantage that subsidies have of not creating 
deadweight loss.  Weighed against this advantage is the disadvantage that subsidies 
potentially encourage those applicants whose inventions have little social value to 
come in search of a handout.   
 
Using Cornelli and Schankerman’s presentation of the mechanism design problem, 
suppose that firms may be of a variety of types, where the government wishes to shift 
the distribution of R&D effort towards the types that are highly productive in order to 
minimise the social cost of producing innovations.  The optimal patent policy, then, is 
a time of protection, T, which is a function of the announced type of the innovator, θ.  
In this case, we can think of θ as indexing the skill of the researcher in terms of 
producing an innovation (as in the Hopenhayn et al paper, discussed above) or the 
value of the innovation for both society and the researcher.  For example, we could 
think of the profit from innovation as π= θe, where e is effort.  Hence, given private 
information  θ  the firm chooses the “size” of innovation, π by setting e.  The 
government only knows the distribution of the θ.  The cost of effort is some non-
concave function.   
 
Suppose that the researcher announces   and the planner determines a patent length, 
T, and fee, f, (to be paid into the system by a patent applicant) according to the 
announced value,  .  The researcher responds by choosing effort, e*, as a 
function of this schedule.  The welfare maximisation problem, where w denotes the 
θ ˆ
)} ˆ ( ), ˆ ( { θ θ f T
                                                 
83 Jaffe and Lerner (2006) discuss the quality of patents. 
84 If the buyout system is not self-financing, we need to take account of the effect of financing on the 
general economy.  An advantage of patents is that they “tax” those who participate in the market for the 
innovation.  While general tax payers under a prize/buyout system arguably gain from the elimination 
of deadweight loss in a system where transfers occur, the transfers would need to be established.  
Further, the deadweight loss benefits are more hidden than the explicit payments made to innovators.       flow welfare gain from the patent (profits plus consumer surplus only) and d denotes 
the flow deadweight loss due to patent protection (and available as a gain once the 
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The solution of this could generally include negative fees for low type θ firms: in 
other words payments – subsidies -- from the government to particular types of 
researchers.  The authors point out that this would require both monitoring schemes to 
ensure that low types actually innovate and public funds to provide the subsidy.  Not 
surprisingly, the length of protection increases with type θ, in order to satisfy 
incentive compatibility.  Hence, the length of protection, T*(θ), (strictly) increases in 
θ so that heterogeneous types of researchers would generally be associated with 
heterogeneous protection regimes.  Indeed, this optimal direct mechanism can be 
implemented by using either an upfront menu of patent lengths and fees or a renewal 
fee scheme
85.   
 
In a more general framework, Scotchmer (1999) shows that a system that does look 
like a patent, a mechanism like the Cornelli and Schankerman system, is what an 
incentive compatible mechanism must look like when the economy has a single firm 
innovating once and where the cost and value of the innovation are not observed by 
the social planner (but are known to the innovator).  In this system the payoff to 
reporting a value and cost pair such that the patent authority would ask the firm to 
conduct the research in the first place must at least equal the payoff to saying that the 
research is not socially worthwhile (individual rationality).  Further, low value 
innovations must get a subsidy but little patent protection while high value 
innovations must pay a fee and get high patent protection in a way that achieves 
incentive compatibility.  Low value innovations do not mimic high value ones as they 
would have to pay a fee instead of receiving a subsidy; conversely, the inventor of a 
low value innovation would get little value from the stronger patent protection.  The 
subsidy instrument is set to optimally tax firms once incentive compatibility is 
achieved.   
                                                 
85 Since T*(θ) is strictly increasing, it can be inverted to obtain the type associated with each patent 
length.  This can be substituted into the optimal fee schedule, f*(θ), that is derived from the constraints 
on the problem, above, at the optimal schedule of patent lengths.  Hence, we obtain 
)) ( ( * ) ( T f T F θ ≡  as the fees associated with each patent length.  Alternatively, an annual renewal 
fee such that the sum of the renewals during the lifetime, T*(θ),  adds up to f*(θ) would implement this 
solution.  
The interesting result of these two papers is that the optimal system does not look “far 
off” from the patent cum renewal fee system that is actually observed.  Specifically, 
the best system in these papers is a renewal system that specifies a menu of fee 
payments in exchange for extensions of the patent life.  The patent holder purchases 
these extensions to patent life more readily for high value innovations, so only these 
patents are long-lived
86.  Further, the incentive to develop high value innovations is 
stronger since precisely these innovations receive longer protection.  Cornelli and 
Schankerman show, however, that there are significant differences between the shape 
of the renewal fee schedule predicted by their theoretical framework and that 
observed in practice.  First, the scheme derived from the optimal mechanism suggests 
subsidies for small innovations, which are not observed in practice (at the patent 
office, at least).  Second, fees should be rising sharply over time in the optimal 
structure, whereas in their sample of European countries, fees actually fall.  They 
comment that these differences should not be surprising in light of the fact that patent 
renewal fees tend to be set so as to finance patent offices rather than with any sort of 
optimal mechanism for eliciting innovation in mind.  Still, these papers suggest that 
the “tools” exist and could be adjusted to implement a socially desirable system. 
 
As was mentioned above, a further characteristic of these models is that the effective 
patent protection of different types of innovations differs: the uniform patent 
protection that is generally observed in practice is not optimal.  Cornelli and 
Schankerman conduct simulations to illustrate the welfare loss of moving to a uniform 
level of protection from a heterogeneous system, finding that the optimal mechanism 
generally raises welfare 2-7% above uniform protection.  
 
Indeed, Hopenhayn and Mitchell (2001) explore heterogeneous protection more fully 
in an optimal mechanism that allows patent authorities to choose the length and 
(leading) breadth of protection as well as the renewal fee schedule.  In other words, 
rather than consider just fees and the length of protection as instruments, Hopenhayn 
and Mitchell (2001) re-introduce breadth (which can be thought of most 
straightforwardly in terms of quality increments in a quality ladder, but could also be 
an exclusion zone in product variety, similar to Klemperer (1990), in their general 
framework) as an instrument to determine how all three of these tools can be 
combined optimally by social planners.  Their paper brings the patent design literature 
“full circle” in the sense of bringing the tools explored in the earlier literature into a 
mechanism design framework.  The paper also derives the result that in this setting, 
the optimal fee is zero.  This latter result questions, then, the conclusions we drew on 
optimal fee schedules based on the papers reviewed above where breadth was omitted 
as an instrument.     
 
Hopenhayn and Mitchell (2001) suppose that ideas of type  Θ ∈ θ  arrive to innovators 
with probability g(θ). This type is not observable by the planner.  The development 
cost of the innovation is c.  Innovators can make profits only if they obtain both 
length, T, and breadth, k, of protection so that profits are a function π(k,T,θ).  The 
                                                 
86 Pakes (1986) models patents as options in the sense that they are applied for at an exploratory stage, 
and information about their value is “revealed” over time.  Early renewal decisions are based on both 
current (known) value and an option value to renew in the future.  Higher value patents are those that 
are renewed longer, but this value is revealed over time, including an ever smaller option component 
and a greater certainty component.  This concept of value is consistent with the models discussed here.    planner must maximise the social benefits of this protection regime, W, subject to the 
usual individual rationality and incentive compatibility constraints when it can set 
breadth, length of protection and also impose a fee.  Hence, the problem is 
straightforward: 
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In this setting, the fees are set optimally to zero under the appropriate sorting 
conditions.  The reason is that the policy design problem optimises social welfare 
under constraints including covering research costs.  Since fees raise these costs, they 
also tighten the constraint.  This makes fees a relatively inefficient instrument 
compared to breadth or length of protection, which operate instead by raising value.   
 
If innovations can be ranked according to how efficient length of protection is at 
generating surplus for the innovator, then the optimal contract involves a menu of 
length and breadth offered to different types of innovation where those innovations 
that get little value out of length get primarily breadth protection (large breadth and 
small length) while those that get large value out of length get primarily length 
protection (small breadth, large length).  The justification is that some innovations are 
“fertile”: they will generate follow-ons – developed by other firms -- that replace the 
original innovation in a short time span.  As we have seen elsewhere, statutory length 
protection is of little value in this case since “effective length” will be much shorter.  
For example, suppose that the probability of arrival of a follow-on innovation in the 
first t periods after patenting for an innovation of fertility type θ is p(t, θ).  The 
patentholder makes profits π per period and the basic innovation costs c to develop.  
Imagine that for some low fertility innovation type, θ1, it is the case that an innovation 
with protection length T1 and no breadth at all (so that all improvements are free to 
infringe) is just expected to generate enough discounted profits to cover the 
development cost.  This may be the case because it is unlikely that improvements will 
be found during time span T1.  On the other hand, another innovation might have high 
fertility type, θ2.  Even with an infinitely-lived patent, it could be that this type might 
not be anticipated to cover its development cost with a zero breadth of protection.  
Instead, since improvements arrive very quickly, such an innovation requires positive 
breadth of protection, k: all improvements would be barred from the market for the 
duration of the patent.  Hence, a patent system could involve protection levels (0, T1) 
and (k, T2), where T1 > T2.  The low fertility type would strictly prefer the first type of 
protection and the high fertility type would strictly prefer the latter type.  The patent 
authority can then screen innovations when it offers such a menu of protections.  
 
In this framework, adding (leading) breadth is more effective at generating profits for 
high fertility innovations since this “slows down” the time at which the innovation 
will be replaced in a way that recalls ODonoghue’s (1998) work.   Notice that there is no licensing allowed here and that patentability and infringement are tightly linked.  
Further, length is adjusted in each case so that the “minimum” level of profits to 
induce innovation is always sent to the innovator in the optimal scheme.  This begins 
to look like a very complex set of requirements to explain to the inventing public, let 
alone the public at large, and to implement at reasonable cost with realistic levers.  
That being said, some new proposals from industry have suggested having “deluxe” 
patents and “run of the mill” patents in a menu that would be at the disposal of patent 
applicants
87.   On the other hand, the point remains that while the Cornelli and 
Schankerman (1999) model appears practically implementable with existing tools, 
this mechanism – especially its conception and manipulation of breadth – would 
require considerable development to imagine in practice.                  
 
VI.  How is the right secured?  Enforcement 
 
Intellectual property rights are only as good as their enforcement, and enforcement 
largely occurs by means of private suits brought by individual inventors or groups of 
inventors against other inventors.  Indeed, Crampes and Langinier (2002) note that a 
patent merely grants the right to sue intruders that have been identified.  Identification 
must be done by the patent holder at some monitoring cost, and even if infringers 
have been identified, the patent holder has the choice of how to react: by defending 
the patent in a court suit, settling out of court for some negotiated value or simply 
accommodating the entry.  If the defence involves a counter suit questioning the 
validity of the patent, the patent holder could find that the upshot of litigation is to 
lose all rights to the intellectual property.  Lemley and Shapiro (2005), developing an 
idea also put forward by Ayres and Klemperer (1999), propose modelling patents as 
“probabilistic” to capture the idea that patents only give a possibility – and not a 
guarantee – of a reward.  The entry decision of a potential imitator depends on how 
aggressive the response to entry will be but also on the prior belief that the parties 
have about the likely strength of the patent, should it be challenged in court. The 
response to entry will, in turn, depend on the underlying patent strength, the 
characteristics of the firms involved, the market, and the cost of the various 
alternative strategies.    
 
Lanjouw and Schankerman (2001) note that while the average litigation rate of 
patents is low – on the order of one percent of all patents – the probability of litigation 
of more valuable patents can be above 10% in some fields and more than 25% in 
pharmaceuticals.  Infringement suits, such as those modelled by Crampes and 
Langinier, are more common than invalidity suits.  Lanjouw and Schankerman note 
that due to the positive externality that a litigant creates by bringing an invalidity suit, 
their seeming paucity may not be surprising.  In other words, a single litigant carries 
the entire burden of the trial costs, but if a patent is found to be invalid all potential 
users of the technology could benefit.  Parties bringing private suits must weigh the 
high cost of the suits against the likelihood of covering these costs by extracting a 
high value in settlement.  In terms of costs for those accused of infringement, 
Lanjouw and Lerner (2001) find that preliminary injunctions – bars on the allegedly 
infringing activity -- are used quite often (almost 20% of the cases they studied) as a 
remedy to infringing behaviour.  An injunction can potentially “shut down” a 
                                                 
87 IBM has proposed this two tier Community patent, see 
www.epip.eu/conferences/epip02/lectures/European%Interoperabily%20Patent%201.1.pdf. business, which can run up the costs of being accused – rightly or wrongly-- very 
high.    
  
The probabilistic nature of patents creates several effects.  The first, following Ayres 
and Klemperer (1999), is that the probabilistic nature of patents induces a certain 
amount of infringement because infringement may pay off: the patent may not be 
upheld as valid (or may simply not be enforced).  This compensates infringers for the 
risk they run of being held in violation of a valid patent.  Their level of risk depends 
on the damages they must pay in the case of a finding of misconduct, and also the 
delay in the finding of infringement.  A regime where patents are probabilistic but  
where disputes resolve slowly may benefit consumers without compromising 
innovation incentives
88 in the same way as compulsory licensing helped consumers in 
Tandon (1982) or restrictive competition policy helped in Gilbert and Shapiro (1990). 
Ayres and Klemperer suggest that an optimal regime would allow patent holders to 
choose from a menu of lengths of protection and probabilities of enforcement.  Such a 
menu allows efficiency gains via lower deadweight loss when there is limited 
infringement, at the same time returning a target reward level to innovators, and 
harnessing the private information of patent-holders.  In this sense, their ideas extend 
some of the insights of the Cornelli and Schankerman (1999) and Scotchmer (1999) 
frameworks to the case of probabilistic patents.   
 
Ayres and Klemperer (1999) list a long set of caveats to their generally positive take 
on uncertain patent rights.  This more negative side of the uncertainty coin has been 
developed by others in a series of papers
89.  One such negative is that the probabilistic 
nature of patents can create bias in the type of research that patents induce.  The 
argument, put forward by Farrell and Shapiro (2007) is as follows.  A standard 
response of an infringer is to challenge the validity of the patent at issue in court.  One 
could think of an index of patent strength, S, where this index reflects the probability 
that the patent would withstand a test of its own validity (for example, a showing that 
that an invention fails to meet novelty, nonobviousness or usefulness criteria).  Patents 
that are weak – have a low value of S -- can “punch above their weight” in terms of 
licensing revenues if private suits are not always brought.   
 
As an example, consider an upstream lab that relies on licensing revenues from 
downstream industry for its income. A licensing scheme using per-unit royalties will 
be optimal for this patent holder as it allows the effective marginal cost of the 
licensees to be raised since the higher effective cost restrains downstream 
competition.  Indeed, the monopoly outcome can be mimicked with the right choice 
of royalty.  If there is also a fixed fee component to the licenses, then the fee can be 
used to distribute the profits from this newly “collusive” industry among the 
participants in this scheme, including the lab.  Even a weak patent can be put to such a 
cynical purpose.   
 
The antitrust status of the licensing agreement we have just outlined would be 
tenuous, of course.  Even if we do not allow this type of collusive scheme, however, a 
                                                 
88 It is important to have both uncertainty and delay to get full benefits.  If disputes are resolved 
immediately, then with some probability the patentee sets the unconstrained monopoly price.  If there is 
no uncertainty, but damages are set high enough to fully reimburse the patentee, then infringers cannot 
break even and so do not enter in the case where the patent is known to be “iron-clad”.     
89 Farrell and Shapiro (2007), Lemley and Shapiro (2005, 2007), Shapiro (2008). weak patent can generate surprisingly large revenues.  As there is a positive 
externality for any single litigant to bringing a suit that reveals the true weakness of a 
patent, if a license for the patent is held by many firms, there is an under-incentive for 
any one to invest in the privately borne cost of litigation. For example, suppose a 
process innovation reduces marginal cost from c to c-ε. Let a potential licensee face 
the choice of joining up to a licensing agreement (now) or being excluded (forever) if 
she brings invalidity litigation. Additional litigants do not improve the chances that 
the patent will be found invalid in court.  A potential licensee will accept the royalty 
rate proposed by the patent holder as long as it exceeds the payoff to litigation: 
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where profit, π, has two arguments: the effective marginal cost of the licensee and that 
of its rival.  The left hand side of the inequality represents the profit earned if all firms 
accept the proposed royalty rate, r, on top of the lowered marginal cost of production 
that the innovation generates, c-ε.  The first term on the right of the inequality is the 
payoff to being the one “excluded” firm that brings suit – and loses – weighted by the 
probability that this will occur.  The last right hand term is the payoff to free access to 
the technology in the case that the suit is successful.  Only one firm needs to bring the 
suit in order to generate this gain to all, so only a single firm – at most – will decide to 
be the “excluded” party.  All the others would do better accepting the proposed 
royalty and awaiting the outcome of litigation.  The maximum royalty rate that all 
firms will accept will depend on the importance to a firm of small changes in its own 
cost compared to small changes in the cost of the entire industry, as this determines 
how a change in royalty rate affects the right and left sides of this equation.  In 
particular, if one thinks that the “fair” royalty rate for a patent of strength S that 
reduces marginal cost by amount ε is Sε there are many cases where the royalty will 
exceed this amount.      
 
Hence, weak patents may be “overcompensated” relative to their true strength (as 
measured by benchmark Sε).  Not only do we suffer deadweight loss because royalties 
are relatively high, but also research incentives are biased towards paths that result in 
“little steps” that would normally fall below patenting criteria because precisely these 
steps are those that are overcompensated in the market.   
 
The policy implication of Farrell and Shapiro’s model is that there is a benefit of 
patent review by the patent office to “weed out” weak patents before this licensing 
game ever occurs.  The review would need to be directed at novelty and non-
obviousness: if patents lack strength due to incorporating subject matter that has not 
heretofore been patented, it may be precisely the more creative and big steps that 
result in “weak patents”.  Hence, the policy recommendation for the review must 
place a specific interpretation on “weakness”.  Encoua and Lefouili (2008) note that 
the argument we have made shows bias for small innovations.  If one allows larger – 
drastic – innovations in a similar framework, they can generate the result that weak 
patents punch below their weight under the right assumptions
90.  Despite this, the 
point made by Farrell and Shapiro is valid in that correcting “errors” in awarding 
patents via the courts may create distortions in some cases that could be avoided by 
more careful patent office review.   While totally eliminating those errors is probably 
                                                 
90 See Encoua and Lefouili (2008) for derivations. too costly, as Lemley (2001) suggests, simply relying on private suits to sort out 
errors also carries significant costs that could be avoided by patent office review
91.  A 
compromise that eliminates more errors would probably be desirable.       
 
Hence, one “take” on modelling enforcement issues is to model patents as generating 
a probability of benefits, but not a guarantee.  The outcome of the probabilistic 
models depends, of course, on what remedies are allowed to the patent holder in the 
case of a successful finding of infringement.  This leads to modelling that compares 
damage systems to injunction systems as means of upholding the right.  Indeed, a 
fundamental legal issue is whether market conduct should be managed by means of 
completely suppressing certain practices, for example by enjoining behaviour, or by 
allowing these practices subject to the payment of damages in  the  case  of  harm.    
Hylton (2006), commenting on an argument made earlier by Calabresi and Melamed 
(1972), notes that property rules – such as the intellectual property right we have 
analysed so far -- prohibit others from infringing the property right without first 
gaining consent.  In contrast, liability rules do not require consent, but rather simply 
require the payment of damages when loss has occurred. Whereas liability may 
simply make an activity unprofitable, an injunction can directly prevent conduct that 
infringes that right
92.  Formalising this idea, Anton and Yao (2004), discussed earlier, 
explicitly includes the possibility of damages as a “reward” that inventors can collect 
in the case of imitation that is triggered by the patent disclosure.  In such a system, 
triggering imitation can be good for the patent holder, if we assume that damages are 
not too expensive to collect and are awarded based on the true value of the innovation.  
Indeed, in that model damages and licenses would serve some of the same functions. 
Hylton focuses more narrowly on the cost side, examining the role of transaction costs 
and the distribution of valuations of the property to determine whether property rules 
or liability rules are more desirable.  For example, if bargaining is not possible, then a 
high value user might effectively be barred from creating value under property rules.  
This case would be equivalent to the case of no licensing in the earlier papers we 
reviewed on patent design. Damages also have their own problems: asymmetric 
information on the magnitude of the damages could create a wedge between the actual 
damage award granted by the court and the damage truly incurred by the property 
holder.  Hence, the nature of market failures in the transfer of intellectual property can 
induce a ranking of liability and property rule systems.          
 
Ayres and Klemperer (1999) focus largely on damages, arguing that these will 
promote limited infringement as imitators “try their luck” against a patent holder who 
may not (successfully) enforce her patent.  Limited infringement may be just what an 
efficient system should aim for, as limited infringement effectively puts a cap on 
deadweight loss, but also allows per-period rewards to research activity to 
accumulate.  In this sense, damages have some of the benefits that a royalty cap did in 
Tandon’s compulsory licensing scheme, which we discussed in the single innovation 
                                                 
91 On the other hand, uncertainty about which of two competing innovators’ patent claims might be 
valid might result in a large spread of small expected rewards, inducing a large amount of entry or 
more efficient bargaining to the extent that this results in “joint ownership” of the right to produce.  See 
footnote 1 and references contained in Ayres and Klemperer (1999).   
92 Ayres and Klemperer draw an analogy to type I and type II errors: Let the null hypothesis be that the 
patent is valid.  A damage system corresponds to a system where a valid patent might not be enforced, 
creating a type I error.  An injunctions system corresponds to one where an invalid patent might be 
enforced, creating a type II error.   model section.  Injunctions do not have this benefit.  They amount to blanket 
prohibitions and so cannot achieve the same efficiency gains of limited infringement: 
either infringement is unlimited or it does not happen at all
93.   
 
Schankerman and Scotchmer (2001) make the bargaining role of damages and 
injunctions more precise to compare their effects. They show that different rules allow 
for different credible threats in the case that negotiations for access to a patent break 
down.  These different levels of credible threats can affect the division of profits 
between a violator and a victim.  For example, suppose that an independent firm has 
developed a profitable application of a patented innovation that infringes the original 
patent.  If the first patent holder has the ability to enjoin an infringing firm, then a 
violator has a “credible threat” not to infringe.  If a violator to credibly “refuse” to 
create value, the threat of refusal can be used to extract value from the original patent 
holder in an access agreement.  Instead, suppose that an inventor facing infringement 
by a high-value violator could use damages to collect this value ex post.  Infringement 
is good for the inventor if the infringer can use the invention to create more value than 
the inventor could.  This value can simply be extracted ex post through a damage 
settlement.  Hence, the ability of damages to allow for value creating activity while 
distributing the gains back to the original patent holder can be more valuable to the 
inventor than the ability to enjoin an infringing firm.  This sort of role for damages is 
very much in the spirit of the socially valuable role that licensing performed in 
Scotchmer’s earlier work on cumulative innovation, summarised above.  Hylton’s 
addition to this is to caution that licensing markets may not work well, and courts may 
also not have the information they need to award appropriate damages
94.             
 
A final set of papers on enforcement pairs litigation issues with the case of 
complementary innovation (“patent thickets”). One of the basic forces in models with 
both these considerations is illustrated by Lemley and Shapiro (2007).  This paper 
investigates the effect of injunctions on bargaining for (licensing) access to patents.  
Similar to the benchmarking exercise conducted by Farrell and Shapiro, above, 
Lemley and Shapiro propose a benchmark “fair” level of compensation for any one 
patent that reflects the value contributed by that patent to the product, a measure of 
bargaining skill in negotiations, and the strength of the patent.  It then compares the 
actual compensation received in a bargaining game to this benchmark level.  Hence, 
the exercise is similar to Farrell and Shapiro (2007), but is in the context of 
“complex” products composed of a large number of patented elements.  Here, the 
benchmark is more complex as well.   
 
Lemley and Shapiro find that, where a product reads on a large number of patents, the 
negotiated royalty rate can exceed this benchmark level.  The reason is based on hold-
up.  Suppose that the cost of developing the product is largely sunk at the point when 
the inventor and the producer attempt to negotiate a royalty.  In this case, the holder of 
                                                 
93 Maurer and Scotchmer (1999) use a similar argument for the benefits of limited entry to suggest that 
an independent invention defence should be allowed in cases of infringement. 
94 Boyce and Hollis (2007) make an even stronger point against injunctions, suggesting that the way 
they are implemented creates the possibility that they can be used as a “court-ordered collusive 
scheme” since they protect the patent monopoly without compensating consumers.  Furthermore, they 
claim that US patent law – perversely -- can allow patent holders to gain more from the injunction 
process if the imitator is found not to have infringed.  This creates an incentive to seek a preliminary 
injunction when patents are weakest. a single patent can “hold up” the producer for the entire value of the product if royalty 
negotiations break down when the alternative to a license is an injunction against the 
product’s sale.  This potentially gives the holder of a single patent the power to extract 
much more than its own contribution to the final value of the product.  Indeed, if a 
product reads on many small patents, each individual patent holder may be very keen 
to exploit this form of hold up to raise its licensing revenues.  Hall and Ziedonis 
(2001) document such hold up in the face of large sunk investments
95.     
 
This type of hold-up can have several undesirable effects.  First, if patent holders can 
extract very large royalties by negotiating independently with the producer, it can 
result in the patent holders’ not wishing to join standard setting groups that might 
license patents in a package.  While the patent holders could potentially increase the 
total surplus to be shared by pooling together their patents, a coordinated solution is 
unlikely to arise given that each patent holder wishes to exploit hold up to her own 
advantage.  Further, negotiating licenses individually for a large number of patents 
could also be an extremely costly process, which could create direct social welfare 
losses.  Secondly, producers might avoid entering an industry where this form of 
hold-up might arise, causing under-provision of certain types of product and further 
attendant welfare losses.  Of course, designing around such patents may be the best 
way to avoid these overcharges, but if re-design is costly it also causes losses in its 
turn.  The paper concludes that various policy solutions, including limiting the use of 
injunctions, and some imposition of reasonable royalty calculations, could go a long 
way to resolving these problems.  While this approach hammers home a point that 
Scotchmer brought up earlier to wit, ex ante licensing works better than ex post 
licensing to efficiently coordinate technology sharing in the case of externalities, the 
presumption of this work is that ex post licensing is the more relevant case.  After all, 
it might be in the interests of the “troll” to wait until investments have been sunk to 
make his presence known to potential victims. In other words, the troll hides under the 
bridge and then emerges to extract large fees.  On the other hand, Siebert and von 
Graevenitz (2005) find evidence for increased ex ante licensing activity in the 
semiconductor industry, where patent thickets are generally thought to be present
96. 
 
These arguments rely on an assumption of complementarity and, as Lerner and Tirole 
have pointed out, it may be quite difficult to determine how complementary or 
substitutable they are and this may change
97.  Indeed, Galasso and Schankerman 
(2008) analyse the effect of fragmentation of patent claims to a valuable “reward” on 
legal disputes when patents may be less than perfect complements.  Imagine that a 
single product that generates market value reads on a large number of patents.  If 
greater fragmentation reduces the contribution of any single patent to the final product 
– i.e., if patents are not perfect complements – the value of litigating (or continuing to 
litigate) any single patent falls because the expected damages fall
98.  They show 
                                                 
95 For related work, see also Gilbert and Katz (2006) and Gilbert and Katz (2007).  The term “patent 
troll” has been coined to refer to entities that aggressively enforce patents in order to extract exorbitant 
licensing fees by exploiting hold-up.  A series of actions involving NTP, Inc. and Research in Motion, 
maker of the BlackBerry, has been held up as a canonical example of patent trolling.  In that case, it 
was claimed that the “troll” was in hiding until the value of the final product was created.     
96 Geradin et al (2007) evaluate proposals for testing ex ante promises to license at reasonable and non-
discriminatory terms.   
97 Choi (2003) incorporates litigation into a patent pool model, finding that pool members with weak 
patents tend not to bring suit against each other because suits provoke counter-suits.   
98 See also Lichtman (2006) on this point.   empirically that greater fragmentation is associated with less delay per dispute in 
settling patent litigation, which suggests that each litigated patent must have smaller 
value. If we were in a world where fragmentation involved strictly complementary 
patents, this should not be the case since each patent is vital to the final product and so 
has equal “value”.  Hence, they reason that the sort of hold-up effects we saw in the 
Lemley and Shapiro work are being dominated empirically by the effect of decreased 
significance of any single patent.   
 
In a separate point, Galasso and Schankerman (2008) note that, to the extent that the 
Unified Court of Appeals has introduced less uncertainty about the outcome of court 
disputes, this decreases the role for information asymmetries in the bargaining process 
that spawns litigation.  In other words, whether the court is or is not biased in its 
judgements is less relevant to the speed of settlement than the fact that the outcome 
may be more certain with a court that always rules a particular way.  As a result, 
patent litigation should be observed to progress more quickly to settlement under the 
Unified Court of Appeals.  This is what they find, but the finding runs counter to 
some of the received wisdom on the events of recent years that litigation has been 
“excessive” in areas where rights are fragmented.  They reconcile these views by 
suggesting that even though they find that delay has fallen per dispute, the total 
settlement time could have increased because the total number of disputes would be 
expected to rise with the degree of fragmentation of rights.  In other words, if 
technologies are more “complex” nowadays there are more points of conflict, so the 
benchmark for the “expected” amount of litigation should rise with fragmentation.   
 
Summarising, one way of modelling the role of enforcement is to say that patents are 
not “iron clad” rights, but instead are probabilistic.  Here, a main finding is that even 
patents that are unlikely to withstand a court challenge could generate very large 
licensing revenues because the incentive for any one user to challenge the patent 
could be socially too small.  This could argue in the US for instating post-patent 
review along the lines of the European system so as to reduce the burden of weak 
patents. A second tack to take is to examine the tools at the disposal of a patent holder 
in the case of infringement and see how varying this set of tools affects efficiency.  A 
role of the tool is to set the threat that can be held out in case negotiations for access 
to patent rights break down.  Liability rules that simply assign damages in the case of 
harm from infringement can act to compensate innovators for use of their innovations 
while allocating the innovation to the high value users.  Some have argued for 
injunctions on the basis of courts’ inability to award damages that reflect value to 
innovations’ creators.  However, injunctions combined with hold-up can allow owners 
of individual patents to extract such high royalty rates that producers who must 
combine patents to create valuable end products could be put off entering in the first 
place.  This argues for damages to be used instead as a remedy for infringement.       
 
VII.  Patent Rights and Competition Policy 
 
Competition law and intellectual property rights have developed as two separate areas 
of law, each with its own goals and methods.  While not a focus of the review, it 
should be clear from the preceding sections that competition policy and patent policy 
interact jointly to determine innovation incentives.  Recalling Gilbert and Shapiro’s 
(1990) perspective, competition policy can determine the flow rewards to patenting 
for any given patent right policy.  Competition policy serves this function by determining the parameters for use, while patent rights determine the parameters for 
exclusion.   
 
While one might think that a limit on flow rewards might necessarily contradict the 
goals of patent policy, Ayres and Klemperer (1999) put forward the argument that 
competition policy and reward to innovators need not be “at odds”.  As we saw in the 
review of single innovation models, small restrictions on the patent-holder’s pricing 
from the unconstrained monopoly level will have a second-order effect on the 
monopolist’s profits (since profits were maximised at the unconstrained price) but a 
first order effect on deadweight loss (since social welfare was not)
99.  By re-balancing 
the patent right and the parameters of use to yield a longer but lower level of market 
power, one could create efficiency gains that would at once benefit consumers and not 
hurt inventors.  To implement this idea some have used Kaplow’s (1984) ratio test: 
the ratio of the patentee’s incremental reward to the incremental social loss of a given 
practice.  This ratio is a litmus test for allowing a practice: the higher the ratio, the 
more desirable the practice.  Ayres and Klemperer’s point is that under such a “ratio 
test”, allowing unconstrained monopoly power probably looks like a bad idea: the 
ratio is zero at the unconstrained monopoly point.                    
 
Evans and Schmalensee (2002) point out that innovators often compete for markets, 
rather than compete on the margin in a market, as in Ayres and Klemperer’s 
treatment.  Competition policy issues for innovative industries may centre less 
controlling per period reward for a given market than on practices that tend to exclude 
other competitors and their innovations from emerging markets.  This gains particular 
force in network industries, of course.  A third area where competition policy can 
interact with innovation incentives is that it can define when and how coordination 
can occur amongst independent players in an industry.  As such, it affects the scope 
for licensing agreements, which we have seen plays a crucial role in patent design for 
cumulative and complementary innovation.              
 
A further difficulty is that, if we think of competition policy as regulating structural 
characteristics of markets, it is not at all clear what sort of market structure promotes 
innovation best.  In general, a firm that already is earning high profits in an industry 
will have little incentive to “replace” itself by innovating more.  On the other hand, 
this sort of firm might wish to innovate in order to prevent another firm from taking 
over the market from outside.  The effect of product market concentration on 
innovation is unclear, then.  Indeed, which product market structure is socially best in 
terms of innovation incentives depends on the interplay of various factors that must be 
balanced quite specifically in order to generate any clear guidance
100.  Further, the 
structure of the innovative process itself determines whether there is socially too 
much or too little incentive for innovation in the economy in the first place
101.   As 
Shapiro (2007) points out, it is not clear whether we would align social and private 
incentives to innovate by increasing or decreasing innovation incentives.  If we don’t 
know what market structure to aim for or whether we are even above or below 
“target” as a starting point for analysing policy, attempting to give any general 
guidance on structure can be daunting.   
                                                 
99 For demand that is not too convex, this will hold for larger reductions in price as well.   
100 See Aghion et al (2005), for example.   
101 See Gilbert (1995) for a discussion of “innovation markets”, how they are distinguished from 
product markets and how their structure is taken into account in antitrust policy.   
Regibeau and Rockett (2007) suggest some overall rules for the interface between 
competition policy and intellectual property
102.  Their starting point is that the 
exclusionary rights granted by intellectual property law do not necessarily confer 
monopoly rents, but they can only be effective at stimulating innovation if they 
sometimes do.  Indeed, as many of the models we have reviewed have shown, any 
single innovation may either fail to find a profitable market or may be pre-empted so 
rapidly by further advances that it generates very little value for the innovator. Still, it 
is the expectation of rents ex ante that generates innovation in the first place. Hence, 
some level of rents must be made available.  In point of fact, competition policy only 
intervenes selectively after an asset – of any type – becomes the basis for significant 
monopoly rents.  A consequence of this difference in timing is that – even if the goals 
and skills of intellectual rights policy and competition policy authorities were the 
same -- the information available to each of these authorities can differ.  Indeed, to the 
extent that competition authorities tend to have access to more detailed information 
than was available at the time property rights were granted, there is a great temptation 
to revisit the trade-off between innovation incentives and the deadweight loss 
resulting from intellectual property rights.  Another consequence is that the 
intervention does not fall evenly across all property, which can feed back on the level 
of expected reward.  
 
If one takes the perspective that intellectual property is there to generate a certain 
reward for innovators then, as Ayres and Klemperer (1999) and Maurer and 
Scotchmer (1999) have emphasised, that reward can be generated even if competition 
law limits the extent to which a rights holder can exercise the property right.  In this 
sense, once competition law is “fixed” property rights design can be adjusted to 
accommodate it and still achieve its basic goals.  The only requirement is that 
competition policy not completely expropriate those gains. Second, as the expectation 
of gains is what counts, intellectual property law need not adjust to individual 
competition law decisions except to the extent that they represent a change in 
competition law policy.  On the other side of the balance, any systematic attempt to 
revisit the trade-off between static and dynamic efficiency by competition law could 
be undesirable.  These trade-offs – evaluated from an ex ante viewpoint -- are what 
determine intellectual property right design in the first place, so revisiting these trade-
offs later – from an ex post viewpoint -- are unlikely to improve innovation incentives 
(which are determined by ex ante evaluations).  Indeed, there is a real risk of 
regulatory opportunism at later stages.  Given that ex post the socially optimal policy 
is free access to intellectual property, the incentives of authorities intervening 
selectively  after  the property has been created are not aligned with those of an 
authority that wishes to optimise ex ante innovation incentives.  This is particularly 
salient at the level of an individual case: to the extent that each case affects 
expectations of reward very little, it is unclear what there is to “lose” by expropriating 
rights in a single case.  Hence, there is an argument for commitment, whatever policy 
is chosen.   
 
Another way of thinking of this interaction is to advocate policy made in a 
coordinated way, rather than delegated to individual court decisions, a point stressed 
                                                 
102 See also Anderson and Gallini (1998) for a volume covering many aspects of intellectual property 
law and competition policy. by Scotchmer (2002).  As we have argued, individual courts may not have the 
incentives to take decisions in a way that preserves ex ante innovation incentives.  In 
this sense, it is well to make policy at the level of the legislature rather than in the 
courts.   
 
A final general issue is clarity.  If antitrust policy is confusing or contradictory in its 
treatment of certain practices, it can be difficult for inventors to calculate any 
particular reward for investment.   
 
This set of principles does not give much guidance on a more specific level of 
particular competition laws and particular elements of intellectual property policy.  
While the argument in the previous paragraphs applies quite generally – even beyond 
intellectual property to other types of property that can be the basis of monopoly 
power – there are interactions between these two bodies of law that are quite specific 
to intellectual property and must be modelled specifically.  Licensing policy is an area 
that has received a lot of attention, where the concern is to preserve the efficiency 
enhancing aspects of licenses while preventing such undesirable elements as over-
pricing.  Maurer and Scotchmer (2006) recommend that a reasonable policy objective 
should be that a licensor should be able to earn as much profit by licensing as by 
producing the product herself in an equivalent production environment.  The idea here 
is not to penalise licensing activity that may, for example, be necessary because of 
financial constraints faced by the inventor.  This principle of “profit neutrality” can 
give a useful benchmark to authorities generating specific rules towards licensing 
activity and fees.   
 
Shapiro (2003) examines another type of “neutrality” to address antitrust treatment of 
proposed settlements of patent disputes.  He suggests that these should generate at 
least as much consumers’ surplus as they would have accrued if litigation had ensued.  
The exact nature of the settlement does not need to be specified: it could be merger, 
joint venture, licensing or other agreements.  The point is that while the invention 
incentives need to be preserved, efficiency is a concern as well.  We need a precise 
rule to balance the two.  Formally, the problem of settlement design is the “dual” of a 
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where x is a set of actions that the two parties can specify in a contract ex ante, π is 
industry profits, s is consumers’ surplus, and   is the surplus that would result from 
litigation.  Given that litigation remains an alternative, the parties can always do better 




What remains is to translate this general rule into settlement policies.  For example, in 
the case of licensing, we could propose capping the royalty rate so as to guarantee a 
minimum level of surplus to consumers.  In the case of mergers, we could apply a 
factor -- taking into account that a merger involves intellectual property issues -- to 
the normal offsetting efficiencies we might demand to justify a merger’s anticompetitive harm.  For example, define a ratio
103 of the harm caused to consumers 
by the merger with patent issues over the harm that would be caused by a merger with 
no patent issues.  If the standard merger would require offsetting efficiencies, E, to 
benefit consumers, a merger involving patenting parties would require E times that 
ratio to be justified.  Hence, we have a “scaling factor” to apply to standard merger 
guidelines and procedures, where the scaling depends on patent strength
104.            
 
More specific issues have been the subject of a range of models incorporating both 
competition and intellectual property policy.  The Shapiro (2007) benchmark 
licensing pricing policy in the context of multiple (complementary) innovations can 
be used to evaluate whether a license is being issued at fair and reasonable terms
105.   
Licensing restrictions such as grantbacks (Choi (2002), Van Dijk (2000)), cross 
licensing (Fershtman and Kamien (1992), Eswaran (1994), Choi (2003)), licensing for 
standard setting (Farrell et al (2007)), as well as joint ventures (Scotchmer (1998)) 
and tying (Whinston (1990, 2001), have been investigated
106.  An area where many of 
the conflicts have emerged has been in industries with network effects, so special 
attention has been paid to modelling in this area (see Farrell and Katz, (1998, 2000), 
for example). Most of these models rely on specific structural features to generate 
their results or require judgments that may be difficult in practice (such whether 
patents are substitutable or complementary).  Hence, it is difficult to make watertight 
rules based on them that policy-makers can easily implement in a wide variety of 
cases.  Developing rules based on a consensus in the literature may need to wait until 
more modelling is done so that a considered consensus can emerge.  Alternatively, 
advocating a rule of reason approach under some broad guidelines may be about as far 
as theory can go.    
 
Finally, in contrast to most of the papers outlined here, the interaction between 
competition policy and innovation has been treated in the growth context to give 
slightly different conclusions.  In a recent example of this, Segal and Whinston (2008) 
                                                 








, where sD is consumers’ surplus in the case of duopoly and sM 
is surplus in the case of monopoly.  To see how this works in practice, take two polar cases of patent 
strength.  If a patent is iron-clad and if the resolution of litigation would be immediate the “reservation” 
level of consumers’ surplus is just the monopoly level and merger creates no further harm to consumers 
when patents are present than without.  Indeed, the numerator of the ratio is zero, so no efficiency gains 
are necessary to justify the merger.  If the patent has no chance of surviving the court challenge, on the 
other hand, the outcome of litigation is the duopoly payoff.  In this case, the ratio is one since both the 
numerator and denominator are the difference between duopoly and monopoly surplus.  Here, the 
efficiency gains that would be required neglecting patent issues would be the same as those required to 
justify the merger in the presence of patents.  See Shapiro (2003) for a full discussion. 
104 As a practical issue, both the solution to the maximisation problem and the level of the ratio depend 
on the strength of the patent, as this determines the outcome to litigation.  Shapiro notes that the 
strength could be difficult for any of the parties, let alone an outside authority, to evaluate accurately.  
Katz and Shelanski (2006, 2007) and Carlton and Gerntner (2003) weigh other factors, such as the 
reduction in duplicative effort, the benefits of specialisation, and various spillover benefits against the 
reduction in competition from merger when comparing merger in innovative industries to “standard” 
cases.     
105 Also see Gilbert (1995) and Gilbert and Sunshine (1995) on the Department of Justice 1995 
guidelines and provisions involving licensing of complementary factors.  
106 See also Gilbert and Shapiro (1997), who map out a large number of issues that are developed in 
later work by both authors.   note that competition policies that protect new entrants from exclusionary behaviour 
by incumbents can raise entrant profits, thereby encouraging innovation by entrants.  
On the other hand these same policies will come back to haunt the entrants in the 
future, should they be successful.  This future lower profit to incumbency can 
eventually slow the rate of innovation.  Hence, an antitrust policy that favours new 
entrants affects the time distribution of benefits from innovation, “front loading” those 
benefits.  This sort of timing issue is something that a growth model can highlight 
particularly well. Segal and Whinston analyse the tension between rewarding entrants 
and incumbents in the light of growth goals and several specific antitrust policies, 
finding that in some cases, policies benefit both entrants and incumbents while in 
others there is a conflict of interest between the two parties.        
 
 
VIII.  Conclusions 
 
This is far from a settled literature.  Many basic points remain unresolved, such as 
what style of protection should be used to promote innovation, and the level of 
incentives compared to the social optimum.  Economic modelling of the complex 
features of the administrative process of getting a patent, the litigation process, and 
the interaction between specific areas of intellectual property and competition law are 
ample, but still do not cover the range of issues actually faced by the wide range of 
actors involved in getting an innovation out to market.  Some topics are areas where 
feeling runs high.  A quick search of the web, for example, indicates that “patent 
trolls” can be viewed as heroes or as demons, with a wide number of arguments on 
either side that have only been partially modelled in the academic literature.  Finally, 
innovation policy is an area where there is intense interest on the part of policy 
makers.  If one wishes to make a contribution to a debate that is viewed as pressing, 
this is a good area to enter.    
 
There are many issues that have not been treated much in this chapter -- since they 
have been developed relatively less in existing work – but which are nonetheless very 
important.  One such issue is how to compensate and motivate scientists to conduct 
innovative activity.  Aghion and Tirole (1994) consider the question of whether 
research units (such as the scientists themselves) or customers (such as the 
manufacturing firm that might use the patent to produce value) should own patents: 
the issue is not so much the design of the property right as the allocation of it across 
interested parties when financing, creating value, and rewards potentially result from 
the effort of a variety of differing agents.  These authors note that the magnitude of 
research activity as well as its nature (such as the size of innovation) can change with 
different organisational structures.  While some work has followed on scientists, their 
contracts and incentives, and the organisations in which they work
107, a lot still 
remains to be done.   
 
This survey has been quite narrow: it has not covered all of intellectual property.  
Copyright and trademark law have been excluded – with regret.  Many of the issues 
are similar between copyright and patent, but not all.  Indeed, technology is forging 
                                                 
107 Kim and Marschke (2005) study labour mobility issues and  Sena (2004) reviews spillovers and 
cooperative agreements.  Sorenson and Fleming (2004) relate norms and institutions of science and 
their effect on patenting activity.   Severinov (2001) studies confidentiality agreements. ahead so rapidly in the area of digital media that copyright issues are a fertile area of 
work.  For example, an issue that comes up with copyrighted digital media but less 
with patented material is whether to protect the intellectual property with legal rights 
or with technical boundaries (such as encryption) 
108.  The economics of trademarks is 
rather distinct from that of patents and copyright, involving reputation mechanisms, 
consumer search and repeat purchase.  Still, to the extent that many products employ 
many methods of protection all at once-- patenting some aspects, employing secrecy 
for others, copyrighting design aspects and trademarking the product as a whole -- 
investigating these rights as they are used together could be a fruitful area to pursue as 
well.  Indeed, using these three tools together to create the sort of exclusion zone 
around a product that is assumed in some of the single-innovation models is a goal of 
such multiple coverage but little work outside of the interaction of trade secrecy and 
patents has been done
109.     
 
A third area where there is relatively little work is the exploration of alternative 
instruments and institutions that are currently available to influence innovative 
activity.  For example, Acharya and Subramanian (2007) examine the effect of 
bankruptcy codes on innovation, where innovation is a relatively “risky” investment.  
Financial structure affects innovation, so that the incentive to innovate depends on 
how creditor-friendly or how debtor-friendly bankruptcy codes are.  Given that there 
appears to be an empirical link between financial structure and innovation (see Hall 
(2002) and references therein), a more systematic investigation of financial 
regulations’ effect on innovation could be useful.   
 
Finally, some recent work has examined the effect of local versus global diffusion of 
information on behaviour (for example, see Boncinelli (2008)).  While one could 
imagine that information about innovation might travel easily amongst members of a 
focussed set of researchers by word of mouth or on the conference circuit, it is 
possible that the function of patents as repositories of information might help to 
spread information to those who would not normally receive it.  This could affect the 
trajectory of future developments as well as their speed.  Developments in the field of 
social network theory could be helpful to diagnose the effectiveness of patent 




                                                 
108 See, for example, Menell and Scotchmer (2007) for a discussion of the law and economics of 
trademark and copyright.  Varian (2005) provides a recent review and opinion on copyright. 
109 For a discussion from the legal perspective, see Merges et al. (2006).  The interaction trademarks 
and patents is studied in Manelli et al. (1994).    
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